




This Article examines the constitutional status of suspicionless searches and 
seizures of groups—an exceedingly important question in an age of terror, and a subject 
recently brought back to the forefront by the searches of subway passengers in New York 
City. It draws on process theory to argue that when a legislature has authorized a group 
search or seizure, courts should generally apply rational basis review. 
First, other areas of constitutional doctrine exhibit deep trust in the power of 
groups to protect their interests in the political process, and there is no reason why the 
Fourth Amendment should not do the same. Second, the Fourth Amendment guarantees 
only reasonableness or cost-effectiveness, which legislatures are particularly competent at 
determining and are normally trusted to do. Finally, the legislative process, if anything, 
exhibits a bias in favor of too few general searches and seizures: the costs of general 
searches and seizures are relatively concentrated and visible, while the benefits to law 
enforcement are diffuse and invisible, which means that advocates of more privacy 
should have an organizational advantage. 
No previous law review article has elaborated all of these reasons for deferential 
review, much less in this depth. The Article makes three other contributions to the 
literature. It details the process failures that should justify more intrusive review, 
including excessive executive discretion and burdening of certain minorities. It provides a 
thorough critique of recent doctrine, including the Edmond and Chandler cases. Finally, 
it debunks the original meaning objections to the political process approach. 
Most of all, the Article provides a fresh look at general searches and seizures. The 
typical law review article analyzes these practices with a narrow and critical Fourth 
Amendment lens. This Article adopts a more comprehensive constitutional perspective, 
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 Suspicionless searches and seizures of groups of people have never been more 
important than they are today. Passenger screens at airports and on the subway are 
essential ways to prevent potentially disastrous terrorist attacks. Random drug tests help 
to preserve the integrity of workplaces and schools. Administrative searches of 
workplaces ensure that businesses are complying with safety regulations. The debate 
about the utility of these methods is vigorous and ongoing. But commentators have paid 
surprisingly little attention to whether this debate should play out primarily in the 
political process or in the courts.1 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has generally assumed that courts must 
independently weigh the costs and benefits of these searches to determine whether they 
are “reasonable” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. A court allows a practice to 
stand only if, in the court’s judgment, that practice is reasonable or cost-effective. This 
Article argues that searching judicial review of general searches and seizures is 
inappropriate. Drawing on the lessons of process theory, the Article shows that courts 
should apply a more deferential level of review because these searches and seizures can 
safely be left to the political process. 
 Process theory has shaped many other areas of constitutional law, including equal 
protection, due process, takings, and free exercise. The theory holds that a court should 
use an indeterminate constitutional provision to strike down a statute only when the court 
can thereby remedy some flaw in the democratic process. Judges should conduct 
intrusive review only when they can somehow produce a more democratic result than the 
legislature did. The theory respects our society’s presumption of democratic 
                                                 
1 The notable exceptions are William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. 2137 (2002); 
Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 Va. L. Rev. 747 (1991); and 
Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 Geo. L.J. 1153 (1998). 
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decisionmaking, and holds simply that judicial review should always be affirmatively 
justified by some representation-reinforcing rationale. 
 Commentators have previously observed that general searches and seizures affect 
large groups who can presumptively protect themselves in the political arena, and thus 
usually exhibit no process failure warranting intrusive judicial review. Michael Klarman 
has said, “[I]f the majority of the community chooses to sacrifice some personal privacy 
in exchange for greater law enforcement efficacy, and does so in a manner evenly 
spreading costs throughout the community (as opposed to concentrating them upon a 
politically impotent minority group), political process theory can have no objection.”2 
Bill Stuntz has observed that “[w]hen the police stop large groups of people…[l]aw 
enforcement’s costs are spread more broadly; the effect is to convert searches and 
seizures from takings, burdening only isolated individuals, into taxes, burdening classes 
of people…These difference mean that political checks are much more likely to 
function.”3 But until now, no-one has systematically elucidated the reasons why it is 
particularly appropriate for legislatures to be primarily responsible for balancing the costs 
and benefits of general searches and seizures. 
 This Article provides three reasons. First, other areas of constitutional doctrine 
exhibit deep trust in the power of groups to protect their interests in the political process. 
The Court applies deferential review to laws burdening groups under the equal 
protection, due process, and takings clauses, and there is no reason why it should not do 
the same under the Fourth Amendment. Second, the nature of the Fourth Amendment 
guarantee means that legislatures are particularly competent at balancing the competing 
                                                 
2 Klarman, supra note 1, at 767. 
3 Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, supra note 1, at 2165. 
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interests. The Fourth Amendment mandates only reasonableness or cost-effectiveness, 
and we trust legislatures to determine the cost-effectiveness of policies affecting groups 
on a daily basis. That is simply what it means to live in a democracy. By contrast, courts 
have little capacity to measure or register the social costs and benefits of general searches 
and seizures. 
Finally, there is no reason to distrust the legislative process because, if anything, it 
is biased towards too few general searches and seizures. Advocates of more privacy have 
an organizational advantage. The costs of such searches are relatively concentrated and 
visible, while the benefits in terms of law enforcement interests are diffuse and invisible. 
This means that collective action problems on the cost side are much less intense and the 
legislative process ought to exhibit a bias in favor of too few general searches and 
seizures. Though courts cannot remedy this problem by enacting general search and 
seizure programs out of thin air, the next best thing they can do is apply deferential 
review to searches and seizures that do make it through the legislative gauntlet. The 
affected groups are perfectly capable of protecting their interests, and do not need the 
courts to intervene to protect them. 
Process theory also implies, however, that courts should reweigh costs and 
benefits when a process failure is present. Practices that discriminate against discrete and 
insular minorities threaten to impose costs on people who have no voice and no power in 
the legislative process. Practices that vest executive officials with a great deal of 
discretion in implementing a scheme allow legislatures to pass the buck to officers who 
might apply their schemes in an arbitrary or discriminatory way. In these situations, 
courts cannot be sure that the legislature has considered and balanced all the relevant 
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values, and strict scrutiny is therefore justified. Conversely, when one of these process 
failures is not present, courts should trust the political process to authorize only a 
reasonable amount of searching and seizing. 
Part I of this Article makes the affirmative case for a political process approach to 
general searches and seizures. Part II then reviews the process failures that should 
constitute the exceptions to the general rule of rational basis review. Part III canvasses 
current Supreme Court doctrine on general searches and seizures, showing that the courts 
have appropriated tasks that should properly be left to legislatures. Part IV concludes by 
identifying the textualist and original meaning objections to deferential review, and 
shows that they are without merit. 
Ultimately, this Article aims to reorient the discourse of general searches and 
seizures. Courts should not distrust legislatures in this area. Searched and seized groups 
are capable of protecting themselves. Intervention by courts promises only to empower 
idiosyncratic dissenters from globally reasonable general searches and seizures. The time 
has come to discard irrational fear of legislative innovation in the area of general searches 
and seizures. 
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I. Trusting general searches and seizures to the political process 
 Political process theory is an attempt to justify judicial review: namely, the power 
of unelected judges to overturn democratically enacted statutes.4 It begins with the simple 
observation that most constitutional provisions are highly indeterminate. While it is clear 
that the Constitution prohibits a President from running for three terms, it is not 
immediately apparent what “due process,” “equal protection,” or “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” mean. Reasonable people might disagree about whether a particular statute 
falls within the language of an ambiguous constitutional provision.5 
Process theory maintains that in these ambiguous situations, the statute should 
normally prevail over the judge’s interpretation. We live in a democracy, which means a 
presumption of democratic decisionmaking.6 Legislatures are the institutions with the 
most democratic pedigree. Thus if reasonable people could disagree about the application 
of the constitutional language, the majoritarian decision of the legislature should 
ordinarily be preferred to the decisions of unelected and unaccountable judges. 
Otherwise, unconstrained application of the Constitution might lead judges to usurp some 
of the policymaking functions that should be the province of society’s elected 
representatives in a democracy. 
 At the same time, a presumption of democratic decisionmaking does not imply 
that legislatures are always right. Process theory also maintains that judges should strictly 
review statutes when there is the potential to make the political process more democratic 
and more responsive to the preferences of the population. For example, a law might 
                                                 
4 The theory is notably associated with the work of John Hart Ely, especially Democracy and Distrust 
(1980). 
5 See Klarman, supra note 1, at 770. 
6 The idea of presumption of democratic decisionmaking (or as he termed it, the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty) was first explicated by Alexander Bickel in The Least Dangerous Branch 16 (2d ed. 1986). 
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burden a discrete and insular minority that is somehow blocked from accessing the 
political process, and thus has no voice in the give and take of the political process.7 Or a 
legislature could delegate policymaking functions to unelected executive officials who 
might apply the law in an arbitrary or oppressive manner. In these situations, judicial 
scrutiny can help to replicate the result that would have obtained in a more perfect 
democracy where everyone is represented. Judicial review in these cases thus does not 
violate the presumption of democratic decisionmaking. The judge is not applying an 
ambiguous constitutional provision to invalidate a majoritarian result. Rather, the judge is 
applying it to reinforce and improve the political system by ensuring that legislatures 
make important policy choices and that every person receives due regard in the 
lawmaking process. Process theory is often referred to as a “representation-reinforcing” 
theory precisely because it holds that judicial review under ambiguous constitutional 
provisions is justified if and only if it has this democracy-enhancing effect.8 
 Political process theory is not uncontroversial. Rival schools of constitutional 
interpretation include textualism, originalism, and positivism.9 Part IV of this Article 
discusses some of the objections that these theories might make to the political process 
approach to the Fourth Amendment. For the moment, it is sufficient to say that the 
ambitions and influence of process theory remain strong. The theory has had an 
undeniably large impact on the course of modern constitutional law. There is hardly an 
area of constitutional law that has not been touched. Process theory has been so 
                                                 
7 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (“[P]rejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
8 See Ely, supra note 4, at 102 (arguing that “a representation-reinforcing approach assigns judges a role 
they are conspicuously well situated to fill,” that is, the role of ensuring a fair process). 
9 See Silas J. Wassserstrom and Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 
Geo. L.J. 19, 63 (1988) (explaining the various ways of approaching the Fourth Amendment). 
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successful because it fits soundly with some foundational assumptions of our society: that 
democratic decisionmaking should be the norm and judicial review the exception; that 
“activist” judges should not overreach in interpreting potentially broad constitutional 
provisions; and that people should normally try to redress grievances by convincing their 
fellow citizens to make a change, instead of resorting to the courts for a plastic 
interpretation of often-ambiguous constitutional commands.10 The theory’s influence and 
continuing resonance with American values mean its consequences must be taken 
seriously. In essence, all the theory says is that judges should have a democracy-
strengthening rationale for using arguably ambiguous constitutional provisions to strike 
down majoritarian results. 
 Enter the Fourth Amendment. It provides, “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.”11 The Amendment has remained largely invulnerable to political 
process theory. Commentators have long noted this peculiarity. Akhil Amar said in 1994, 
“From a legal process perspective, we fail to focus clearly on basic constitutional 
questions like: Who should decide whether a search or seizure is reasonable? 
Legislatures? Administrators? Judges? Juries? Some combination?”12 One explanation, 
according to Prof. Amar, for the theory’s relative lack of influence in Fourth Amendment 
                                                 
10 The notion that judicial review should be as narrow as possible, and that democratic decisionmaking 
should be given its full scope within constitutional limits, traces back at least to Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893). See also Klarman, 
supra note 1, at 782 (“A political process theory of judicial review is grounded on a reasonably 
uncontroversial vision of democracy by which majorities rule through elected representatives”). 
11 U.S. Const. Amend. IV. 
12 Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 758 (1994). 
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law is the Amendment’s long-standing but ahistorical association with the criminal 
procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights.13 A bevy of other commentators have noted 
that the Fourth Amendment is, like all the other constitutional provisions, amenable to a 
political process approach.14 Most recently, Bill Stuntz has criticized the Court’s 
interpretation of the Amendment on political process grounds, arguing that the Court 
should use the Fourth Amendment to protect against police discrimination but generally 
defer to legislatures that pass laws impinging on the general privacy of ordinary 
citizens.15 
Yet despite the clear analogues in other areas of the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights, political process theory has left the Fourth Amendment virtually untouched. No 
tiers of strict scrutiny or rational basis review exist under the Fourth Amendment, as they 
do under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court essentially applies strict scrutiny in 
every case. In the area of criminal investigation, the Court presumes that a warrant and 
probable cause are required, subject to exigent circumstance and other exceptions. In the 
case of every other search or seizure, the Court applies a balancing test, assessing 
reasonableness under all the circumstances. But even there the Court does not defer to 
legislative judgments. Rather, it undertakes its own de novo balancing of the search or 
                                                 
13 Amar, supra note 12, at 758. The Fourth Amendment originally had nothing to do with criminal 
procedure: it arose out of the disputes with the crown over the searches conducted by customs agents under 
general warrants and writs of assistance, and contemplated enforcement not through an exclusionary rule 
but rather through a civil damages remedy. 
14 See, e.g., Wassserstrom and Seidman, supra note 9, at 63 (“One theory of the fourth amendment requires 
the Court to compensate for defects in the political system by replicating the results that would be achieved 
if all preferences were accurately reflected in the political process.”); Kahan and Meares, supra note 1, at 
1172 (“When a community can be seen as internalizing the coercive incidence of a particular policy, courts 
are much less likely to second-guess political institutions on whether the tradeoff between liberty and order 
is worthwhile”); Klarman, supra note 1, at 782 (1991) (arguing for a political process approach to the 
Fourth Amendment); Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman’s” Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust 
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751, 1768 (1994) (observing that strict scrutiny of 
majoritarian police policies is difficult to justify once the Fourth Amendment is seen to mandate only 
“reasonable” police behavior). 
15 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780, 834 (2006). 
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seizure at issue. This one-size-fits-all approach to the Amendment means that the Court 
frequently invalidates legislative enactments without even hinting that there may be 
situations where such enactments are entitled to deference.16 
 The Fourth Amendment is ripe for a political process treatment, and the best 
candidate is the general, suspicionless search or seizure. These practices include random 
checkpoint traffic stops; random drug tests; administrative inspections of homes and 
businesses; airport screening procedures; subway searches; and all other searches and 
seizures of groups of people. To see why courts should apply rational basis review to 
these practices, it is helpful to first consider a prototypical democracy. Assume that this 
society is a town-hall style direct democracy. Assume that it is considering whether to 
authorize a checkpoint traffic stop in the center of town; say, to prevent the flow of illegal 
drugs through the town center. Assume also that the members have similar utility 
functions: that is, each person derives the same utility from marginally greater privacy 
and security. Finally, assume that the proposed practice will affect everyone in the same 
way; for instance, because it is a checkpoint stop on Main Street that everyone uses once 
per day. 
In this prototypical society, a majority vote will perfectly determine whether the 
practice is reasonable; that is, whether the benefits exceed the costs. Every person will 
experience the same intrusion: that occasioned by the stop. Because they have the same 
                                                 
16 For cases where the Court has invalidated statutes, without any mention of the potential for deference, 
see, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (invalidating a state statute requiring candidates for high 
political office to take drug tests); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (invalidating a state statute 
authorizing police officers to enter homes without warrants to make routine felony arrests); Marshall v. 
Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (invalidating Congressional statute authorizing OSHA inspectors to 
make warrantless searches of businesses); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (invalidating state 
statute that authorized warrantless and suspicionless eavesdropping); and Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 
(1979) (invalidating state statute that gave police officer authority to stop individual and request name and 
address). Some of these cases would, however, come out the same way under the political process 
approach, due to the presence of some process failure. 
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utility functions, each person feels this intrusion the same way. Finally, every person can 
evaluate the benefit to them in terms of less drug trafficking, greater security, and less 
crime. If a majority approves the search, this means that the benefits exceed the costs; if a 
majority does not approve it, the benefits do not exceed the costs. It is not necessary for a 
court to determine reasonableness, or cost-effectiveness, because even if the court could 
correctly do so, it would be superfluous. The Fourth Amendment would be completely 
self-enforcing in this society with respect to this practice. 
 It will be quickly pointed out that actual democracies differ from this prototype in 
several notable ways. First, any practice at most affects groups, not every person. Not 
everyone uses that street every day. Even in the affected group, it may affect some more 
than others: for instance, people who use that road twice a day instead of once. 
Second, people do not have identical utility functions: some people value privacy 
more highly than others. This introduces the possibility of error in the majority vote, 
because everyone receives only one vote, regardless of the strength of their preferences. 
For example, in a society of three, where one person experiences a net detriment of three, 
and the two others each a net benefit of one, the practice will be approved, even though it 
has a net detriment of one and thus decreases social welfare. 
Finally, actual democracies are representative rather than direct democracies, 
which introduces collective action problems. As public choice theory points out, it is 
relatively harder to organize people who are diffusely harmed or benefited by a policy. 
People in such groups have incentives to free ride on the efforts of others. As a result, 
when costs are diffuse and benefits are intense, inefficient enactment may occur. And 
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when benefits are diffuse and costs are intense, inefficient failure to enact may occur.17 
For all three of these reasons, one might argue that legislatures will never perfectly 
determine the cost-effectiveness of general searches and seizures, and as a result, judicial 
review is necessary to enforce the reasonableness command of the Fourth Amendment. 
 The problem with this set of arguments is that it adopts perfection as the relevant 
point of comparison. The correct baseline is not perfection, however, but the alternative: 
judicial review of reasonableness. If perfection were the standard, it would imply that 
courts should superintend all social policy under a general reasonableness requirement, 
because legislatures cannot be trusted to appropriately weigh the costs and benefits. That 
is of course entirely inconsistent with our fundamental commitment to democracy. As 
Einer Elhauge has observed, critics of legislatures are often excessively demanding: 
The political process may have defects, but critical analysis is misleading 
if it proceeds on the premise that those defects should be measured by the 
‘nirvana’ standard, where any deviation from an unobtainable ideal is 
grounds for criticism. A more accurate measure of the desirability of any 
legal process, or for that matter any law, is whether the mix of results it 
produces is better than the mix of results we could get with alternative 
processes or laws…This suggests that the true basis for putting one's faith 
in the democratic process is not a naive belief that it will always produce 
the best results, but a lack of naiveté about the alternatives.18 
 
Or, as Winston Churchill succinctly put it, “Democracy is the worst form of government, 
except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”19 One might be 
skeptical of judges’ ability to determine the reasonableness of search and seizure 
practices for a number of reasons: primarily their incompetence to effectively balance 
                                                 
17 See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 Yale 
L.J. 31, 36 (1991). 
18 Id. at 109. 
19 Oxford Dictionary of Modern Quotations 55 (Tony Augarde ed., 1991) (quoting Winston Churchill). 
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social costs and benefits, and the unaccountable and therefore less legitimate nature of 
their decisions. 
 The operative question, then, is whether legislatures can be trusted to balance the 
costs and benefits of general searches and seizures. When we say trust in constitutional 
law, we mean not that the legislature will get things right one hundred percent of the 
time. Rather, we mean that the legislature will get enough things right enough of the time 
to outweigh the disadvantages of turning decisions over to unelected and unaccountable 
judges who often have little capacity to determine whether a policy is cost-effective, or 
expedient, or reasonable. 
The three Sections in this Part will show that trust is generally warranted in the 
case of general searches and seizures. First, in other areas of constitutional law, the Court 
generally trusts the political process to handle issues involving groups of people. The 
Court has long assumed that groups can protect their interests by political means, and that 
the clash of groups will ultimately produce the social good. Second, the nature of the 
Fourth Amendment guarantee means that deference is especially warranted in the general 
search area. The Amendment guarantees only cost-effectiveness, which legislatures are 
presumptively capable of handling—and far more competently than judges. A final 
reason for deferring to legislative judgments is the nature of the groups affected by 
general searches and seizures. The political process, if anything, exhibits a bias in favor 
of searched and seized groups, because those groups experience acute and visible costs, 
and thus have an organizational advantage over the diffuse beneficiaries who experience 
only invisible gains. When a general search or seizure makes it through the legislative 
gauntlet, the Court should thus be especially confident that the benefits exceed the costs. 
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A. Other areas of constitutional law trust legislatures to handle issues involving groups 
 
 It is impossible to determine scientifically how much is too much when it comes 
to legislative deviation from the ideal of the social good, and when the costs of judicial 
review are worth bearing in order to provide a corrective. The problems of concentrated 
costs, collective action problems, and different preferences exist, yet at the same time 
constitutional law gives the democratic process an extraordinarily wide sway, consistent 
with our commitment to representative democracy. Analysis of the Fourth Amendment 
problem should thus begin with other constitutional provisions that have been far more 
influenced by process theory. These provisions show the extent to which the Court has 
been willing to tolerate the problems inherent to representative democracy. 
A review of other constitutional provisions shows immediately that the Court 
trusts the political process to handle issues involving groups. The Equal Protection 
Clause, for example, could be read to give courts a license to review the expedience of 
any legislative enactment that burdens one group of people unequally. The Supreme 
Court has not adopted that interpretation. The Court applies rational basis review so long 
as the law does not unequally burden a suspect class.20 This means that the vast majority 
of laws affecting groups receive deferential review under the clause. Only statutes that 
classify by race, alienage, or national origin are subject to strict scrutiny because “[t]hese 
factors are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws 
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy.”21 But it is 
not easy for groups to obtain a right to strict scrutiny. The poor, for example, are not a 
suspect class because they are “not saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a 
                                                 
20 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
21 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
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history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.”22 As a result, “[w]hen social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal 
Protection Clause allows the States wide latitude, and the Constitution presumes that 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process.”23 
The Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause thus demonstrates a 
fundamental trust in the power of groups to protect their interests in the political process. 
While groups may not get exactly the equality they deserve and are arguably entitled to in 
a perfect world under the Clause, the Court recognizes that because of groups’ substantial 
power, issues involving them are best left to the political process. 
 The Court has exhibited this same faith in the power of groups in its interpretation 
of the Due Process Clause. The Clause could be read to give courts the authority to 
review the reasonableness of any legislative enactment at the behest of an affected group, 
due to the problems with the democratic process adverted to above. But courts normally 
do not strictly review the substantive wisdom or expedience of laws affecting economic 
or social welfare. The Court strictly scrutinizes deprivations only of “those fundamental 
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.”24 The rest are, despite the flaws in the political process adverted to above, 
trusted to legislative resolution. As Justice Rehnquist recognized in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 
By extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty 
interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public 
debate and legislative action. We must therefore exercise the utmost care 
                                                 
22 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
23 Cleburne Living Ctr., supra note 21, at 440. 
24 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
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whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field, lest the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy 
preferences of the members of this Court.25 
 
The Court’s due process jurisprudence thus indicates a fundamental faith in the likelihood 
that clashing groups will eventually lead to the social good. Most deprivations receive 
only rational basis review because the Court trusts legislatures to balance the needs of 
individuals against the needs of society. Where fundamental rights are not implicated, “it 
is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the advantages and disadvantages of the 
new requirement.”26 In general, “[f]or protection against abuses by legislatures the people 
must resort to the polls, not to the courts.”27 
The same trust in groups is evident in the area of procedural due process. The Due 
Process Clause could theoretically be read to require a hearing any time the state deprives 
property, or any time the state deprives a significant amount of property. The Court has 
not taken this route. Instead, it has held that a hearing is required only when a deprivation 
affects individuals, and not when it affects a large group, as established by the 
complementary cases of Londoner v. Denver and Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. 
State Board of Equalization.28 The Court recognized in Bi-Metallic that groups can 
protect themselves in the political process, and thus do not need courts to protect them by 
granting them hearing rights: 
The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town 
meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state 
                                                 
25 Id. at 720. Justice O’Connor also concurred in Glucksberg on group-based political process grounds: 
“Every one of us at some point may be affected by our own or a family member’s terminal illness. There is 
no reason to think the democratic process will not strike the proper balance between the interests of 
terminally ill, mentally competent individuals who would seek to end their suffering and the State’s 
interests in protecting those who might seek to end life mistakenly or under pressure.” Id. at 737. 
26 Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
27 Id. at 488 (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877)). 
28 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908); Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 
441 (1915). 
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power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, 
sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. 
Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex 
society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the 
rule.29 
 
Procedural due process doctrine thus also expresses a fundamental faith in the democratic 
process. Most notably, it exhibits confidence in the power of groups to protect their 
interests. 
 Finally, regulatory takings doctrine also evidences trust in the power of groups. 
Whether a regulation constitutes a taking is necessarily a fact-sensitive inquiry: “if 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”30 The definition of a taking 
could theoretically have a very broad sweep. But the Court has restricted its definition by 
trusting the power of groups. The broader the sweep of the regulation, the easier it is for 
the affected people to protect themselves in the political process, and the more likely the 
deprivation will not be classified as a taking. Zoning regulations are presumptively valid, 
as are other comprehensive land use plans.31 The purpose of judicial review of takings, 
according to the Court, is essentially to protect individuals from a specific process flaw: 
to make majorities internalize the cost of taking property from politically powerless 
individuals. But when such burdens affect groups rather than individuals, the Court 
“indulge[s] our usual assumption that the legislature is simply adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life in a manner that secures an average reciprocity of advantage to 
everyone concerned.”32 Just like the more explicit formulations in the equal protection 
and due process contexts, takings doctrine exhibits a presumption that groups normally 
                                                 
29 Bi-Metallic, supra note 28, at 445. 
30 Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
31 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 132 (1978) (holding that New York City’s 
historic landmark regulation did not constitute a taking). 
32 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992). 
 18
can take care of themselves in the political process, and a corresponding restriction of 
courts to situations where the political process is likely to go awry. 
Like laws that treat groups unequally, deprive groups of property, deprive groups 
of property without a hearing, or take property without compensation, laws that authorize 
general searches and seizures impact the interests of groups, not individuals. In those 
other areas, the Court has implicitly determined that so long as there is significant 
spreading of costs, even if there is not perfect spreading, judicial review would cause 
more harm than good.33 The potential pitfalls of democratic governance do not justify 
judicial review. Groups can organize to protect their interests, can pressure 
representatives, and can generally make themselves heard quite effectively. 
The treatment of groups in other areas of constitutional law implies that, so long 
as searched or seized groups are not discrete and insular, and no other process failure is 
present, they should be able to protect themselves from an unreasonable amount of 
searching and seizing in the political process.34 Dissenters should press their claims in the 
legislature rather than in the courts. While general searches and seizures authorized by a 
legislature might not be absolutely justified on a cost-benefit rationale, the treatment of 
groups in other areas of constitutional law shows that the Court believes that courts can 
do no better. 
                                                 
33 See Kahan and Meares, supra note 1, at 1172 (noting that when a community can be said to internalize 
the relevant cost, courts generally do not apply heightened scrutiny, with reference to the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause, dormant Commerce Clause, and Free Exercise Clause). 
34 See Klarman, supra note 1, at 767 (“[I]f the majority of the community chooses to sacrifice some 
personal privacy in exchange for greater law enforcement efficacy, and does so in a manner evenly 
spreading costs throughout the community (as opposed to concentrating them upon a politically impotent 
minority group), political process theory can have no objection.”); Wasserstrom and Seidman, supra note 9, 
at 96 (“If motorists and airline passengers think that the intrusiveness and inconvenience of these searches 
outweight [sic] the benefits to law enforcement, there is no reason to doubt that their political 
representatives will respond to the complaints of their constituents”). 
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 Deference to general searches authorized by a legislature is, if anything, more 
appropriate than the similar deference in other areas. First, the personal interests involved 
in these searches and seizures are often less compelling than those involved in cases 
where the Court already applies rational basis review. A drug test or the intrusion 
occasioned by being stopped on the road for a few minutes is certainly no more 
momentous than the values involved in the equal protection, due process, and takings 
cases. These cases have involved much more than a brief intrusion on privacy: they have 
involved, for example, the right to equal funding of school districts (Rodriguez), and the 
right to make decisions about when and how to end a terminally ill life (Glucksberg).35 
This is not to denigrate Fourth Amendment values. It is merely to point out that the Court 
feels confident leaving disputed questions of constitutional value to the political process 
in contexts that involve interests that are just as or more compelling than the privacy 
interests involved in general searches and seizures. That is because the Court has 
overwhelming confidence in democratic values and the virtues of self-government. 
Where groups are affected and process flaws are absent, very important, disputed 
questions of value can safely be left to the political process. 
 The nature of the Fourth Amendment guarantee also means that the case for a 
political process approach to general searches and seizures is all the more compelling 
there. The Fourth Amendment requires only that searches and seizures be reasonable. 
Reasonableness must, in some sense, mean only cost-effectiveness.36 The Court has long 
                                                 
35 Justice Stevens made this point in dissent in Lucas, where he pointed out that a neutral law of general 
applicability should receive deference in the takings context because if such a law may severely burden the 
practice of religion, “a comparable burden on property owners should not be considered unreasonably 
onerous.” Lucas, supra note 32, at 1072 n.7. 
36 The concept is of course familiar from negligence law, see United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 
169 (1947) (Hand, J.). 
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recognized that Fourth Amendment reasonableness requires only a balancing of social 
costs and benefits. As the Court said in T.L.O., 
The determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any 
specific class of searches requires balancing the need to search against the 
invasion which the search entails. On one side of the balance are arrayed 
the individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security; 
on the other, the government’s need for effective methods to deal with 
breaches of public order.37 
 
This need not be a restrictive balancing that considers only economically quantifiable 
factors. But it is a balancing nonetheless. The Fourth Amendment inquiry is inevitably a 
balance between liberty and privacy on the one hand, and the government’s interest in 
searching or seizing on the other.38 
And once the Fourth Amendment is seen as a guarantee of cost-effectiveness, 
then in the absence of process failures discussed below, the legislature should be 
especially capable of striking an acceptable balance between security and liberty or 
privacy. The Fourth Amendment is in essence a requirement of social welfare 
maximization.39 And maximizing social welfare is precisely what we trust legislatures to 
do. The reason we choose democracy as our form of government is because we have 
implicitly decided that it will ordinarily lead to the greatest good for the greatest number. 
Just as we trust legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of tax policy or pensions 
policy, we should trust legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of general searches 
                                                 
37 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985). See also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) 
(“the permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the 
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests”); 
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 523, 555 (1976) (“In delineating the constitutionals safeguards 
applicable in particular contexts, the Court has weighed the public interest against the Fourth Amendment 
interest of the individual”). 
38 See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817 (1996) (“It is of course true that in principle every Fourth 
Amendment case, since it turns upon a ‘reasonableness’ determination, involves a balancing of all relevant 
factors”) (emphasis added). 
39 See Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 49, 64 (“A reasonable 
search is a cost-effective search”). 
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and seizures. The Fourth Amendment is not a font of timeless principles stretching back 
to Magna Carta—as the Due Process Clause is—and which courts therefore have a 
special duty to enforce. In the absence of process failures, general searches and seizures 
seem a much more likely candidate for deference than similar laws in the due process or 
equal protection contexts, where the constitutional guarantees embody deontological 
concepts of fairness and morality. Because courts normally defer to legislatures that 
deprive groups of property or liberty, then a fortiori they should defer to legislatures that 
deprive privacy under similar conditions. 
 
B. Legislatures have a comparative advantage in determining the reasonableness of 
general searches and seizures 
 
 Other areas of constitutional law demonstrate a basic trust of the power of groups 
in contexts far more sensitive than the cost-effectiveness guarantee of the Fourth 
Amendment. The essence of what it means to live in a democracy, rather than in a society 
ruled by elite judges, is that the legislature should get to determine the social good.40 That 
presumption of democratic decisionmaking should be trusted all the more with group 
searches and seizures, because the Amendment requires nothing more than cost-
effectiveness, which is what we trust legislatures to determine on a daily basis. 
It is helpful, however, to give content to this intuition. Even though legislatures 
might not perfectly determine reasonableness—for the uneven preference, collective 
action, and concentrated costs problems discussed above—those costs are present in all 
                                                 
40 This is the fallacy of public choice theory, which sees more intrusive judicial review as a cure-all for 
democracy, without recognizing that rule by courts has problems of its own. See Elhauge, supra note 17, at 
67 (noting that “[i]nterest group theory can justify more intrusive judicial review only if it shows that the 
litigation process has some comparative advantage over the political process,” and that the litigation 
process often has the same free rider and collective action problems as the political process). This is 
discussed more fully below. 
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the forms of decisionmaking where the court already defers: for example, in the area of 
social and economic legislation under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
And where the constitutional guarantee is cost-effectiveness, as under the Fourth 
Amendment, the comparative competence of legislatures in weighing costs and benefits 
provides an additional reason for deferential review. There are at least five reasons why 
legislatures should be better than courts at determining the reasonableness of a given 
general search or seizure practice: and accordingly, why the costs of judicial review in 
terms of error and reduced legitimacy are likely to be especially high. 
 First, legislatures are better at rationally weighing the costs and benefits of a 
practice. The Court is well aware of this in the equal protection and due process contexts. 
In Glucksberg the Court recognized that one purpose of deferential review is to allow 
legislatures to conduct cost-benefit balancing: “by establishing a threshold requirement—
that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental right—before requiring more than 
a reasonable relation to a legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need 
for complex balancing of competing interests in every case.”41 In Rodriguez the Court 
noted that “the judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States inflexible 
constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the continued research and 
experimentation so vital to finding even partial solutions to educational problems and to 
keeping abreast of ever-changing conditions.”42 
 The problem of balancing costs and benefits is equally complex in the area of 
general searches and seizures. Judges simply have no rational way to determine the cost-
effectiveness of a particular police practice. The judge’s traditional tools of logic and 
                                                 
41 Glucksberg, supra note 22, at 722. 
42 Rodriguez, supra note 24, at 43. 
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history do not yield unambiguous answers. Judges can identify the interests involved, but 
have no way of deciding what weight those interests should receive and whether one 
interest outweighs the other. 
By contrast, legislatures have a developed ability to register competing 
preferences. The legislators represent the relative weight of the interests involved: the 
members are in direct contact with the people affected by the action, they have an interest 
in being a more or less accurate proxy for those interests, and legislatures can adopt 
compromise solutions that give appropriate weight to all the interests involved. 
Legislators would normally be unwise to authorize invasions of privacy unless the public 
benefits are likely to justify the costs. Even with the uneven preference, concentrated 
costs, and collective action problems noted above, legislatures are much more likely than 
courts to register a judgment that reasonably reflects the preferences of the population. 
 The Court recognizes its inability to balance costs and benefits in the checkpoint 
traffic stop context. In Sitz Chief Justice Rehnquist said, 
[The Fourth Amendment] was not meant to transfer from politically 
accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among 
reasonable alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to 
deal with a serious public danger. Experts in political science might 
disagree over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers 
is preferable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, 
the choice among reasonable alternatives remains with the governmental 
officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, 
limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.43 
 
In other contexts, however, such as drug testing by public officials, the Court 
inexplicably attempts to conduct its own cost-benefit analysis. The result in one of the 
Court’s drug testing cases, Board of Education v. Earls, shows how the Court simply has 
no principled way to make the complex balancing decisions that underlie the 
                                                 
43 Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990). 
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reasonableness of a particular practice.44 Both the majority and dissent agreed on the 
interests involved: the students’ privacy and the government’s desire to root out drug 
abuse. But their “analysis” of the balance amounted to a restatement of these factors in a 
more or less emphatic way. The majority rejected the suggestion that participants in 
extracurricular activities have a greater privacy interest than participants in athletic 
activities (where the Court has permitted drug testing);45 credited anecdotal evidence of 
drug activity at the school;46 and found that prevention of a drug problem was a 
sufficiently strong interest, even in the absence of concrete evidence of a problem.47 The 
dissent thought that participants in extracurricular activities did have a greater privacy 
expectation;48 believed there was no immediate danger of a drug problem;49 and believed 
that even if there was a drug problem, it was not sufficiently big to justify a drug testing 
program.50 Both positions boiled down to a thumbs up or thumbs down on the program, 
with each judge voting his or her personal preference. There was simply no rational link 
between the actual interests involved in the case and the decision that the Court handed 
down. 
A majority vote in the legislature would be superior even if it were not 
representative: the legislature is far more numerous and thus a better sample of the 
expectations of “the people” protected by the Amendment than a nine (or three!) member 
appellate court ever could be. Legislative balancing is all the more reasonable because the 
fortunes of legislators are directly tied to their constituents’ preferences. A majority vote 
                                                 
44 Bd. of Education of Independent School Dist. No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
45 Id. at 831. 
46 Id. at 835. 
47 Id. at 835. 
48 Id. at 847. 
49 Id. at 849. 
50 Id. at 850. 
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of legislators thus bears some rational relationship to the actual costs and benefits, unlike 
a vote of the justices.51 
 The second reason why legislatures are better at determining reasonableness is 
that they have better access to the relevant facts. The typical plaintiff willing to challenge 
a general search or seizure in court is likely to have an idiosyncratically large privacy 
interest. And it may be difficult for the government to communicate to a court the diffuse 
benefits of a particular practice. A court is likely to view the reasonableness question in 
any such case as close, even if in reality it is not. Nor can the judges generate facts on 
their own. The justices periodically bemoan the Court’s inability to collect the data they 
need to make important decisions about police policy.52 What all this means is that the 
justices often have to make search and seizure policy on the basis of biased facts and their 
own personal knowledge and experience. Their own experience is also likely to be highly 
unrepresentative and (perhaps unintentionally) biased.53 
                                                 
51 Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized as much in Sitz, which upheld a system of drunk driving checkpoints: 
“[The requirement that courts inquire into the effectiveness of checkpoint stops] was not meant to transfer 
from politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reasonable alternative 
law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal with a serious public danger. Experts in police 
science might disagree over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers is preferable as an 
ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the choice among reasonable alternatives remains 
with the governmental officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public 
resources, including a finite number of police officers.” Sitz, supra note 43, at 453. Given this commitment 
to politically accountable decisionmaking, it is puzzling why the Court in other contexts, such as drug 
testing, continues to engage in de novo evaluation of reasonableness. 
52 See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 549 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Court’s 
“perception of what society is prepared to recognize as reasonable is not based on any empirical data; rather 
it merely reflects the perception of the four Justices who have joined the opinion that the Chief Justice has 
authored.”); Georgia v. Randolph, 126 S. Ct. 1515, 1532 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority 
has no support for its basic assumption—that an invited guest encountering two disagreeing co-occupants 
would flee—beyond a hunch about how people would typically act in an atypical situation.”). See also 
Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 
2002 Wis. L. Rev. 657, 667 (observing that “the courts have built up a large body of law regulating 
professional police officers without seeking information about what those officers actually do in the field”). 
53 See Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 359, 
363 (1994) (“All permanent government officials—even Article III judges—may at times pursue self-
interested policies that fail to reflect the views and protect the liberties of ordinary Americans”). 
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Legislatures, whatever their flaws, are much better at collecting the information 
necessary to determine what interests are at stake and how much weight they should 
receive. A rational legislator is in constant contact with his or her constituents. Moreover, 
the legislator represents ordinary, average people, not the lone dissenter. Legislators can 
seek out facts instead of relying simply on those that interested parties put before them. 
The self-interested amici in the appeals court become the called witnesses in the 
legislative hearing. Legislatures can also impose programmatic or compromise solutions, 
thus giving the witnesses a much greater incentive to tell the truth about what is really 
going on in the world, instead of selecting facts to help one side or the other in a one-shot 
lawsuit. Finally, legislatures can harness expertise by delegating to expert administrative 
agencies. 
The Court’s relative incompetence in finding legislative facts is an important 
reason why it should apply deference to a statute authorizing a general search or 
seizure.54 The Court is unlikely to be able to collect better information than the legislature 
about the interests involved, and might end up emphasizing some interests over others on 
the basis of the unrepresentative parties before it.55 
 The third reason why it is preferable to have legislatures balance costs and 
benefits is legitimacy. It is more legitimate for a legislature to balance costs and benefits 
                                                 
54 See also Ely, supra note 4, at 53 (“Broad questions of public policy are likely to involve what are called, 
uncoincidentally, ‘legislative facts,’ or broad factual generalizations, as opposed to specific ‘adjudicative 
facts.’ The conventional wisdom here, that courts are markedly worse than legislatures at determining 
legislative facts, surely can stand significant qualification—but at the same time there isn’t any reason to 
suppose they are better at it”). 
55 As Judge McGowan once noted, “There are obvious advantages in the legislative approach over the 
judicial. Decisional rule-making can occur only in the sporadic context of individual cases. The Code 
approach permits the whole area to be surveyed at once, with the result that the provisions made for various 
parts of the process can be related to, and made consistent with, each other. And, before the Code becomes 
law in any state, it will have to run the gamut of public legislative hearings in which all interested and 
informed persons can be heard, as contrasted with the immediate parties to a criminal prosecution.” Carl 
McGowan, Rule-making and the Police, 70 Mich. L. Rev. 658, 672 (1972). 
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than to leave it to an unelected judge. Ordinary people can feel involved in the process of 
formulating the rules that apply to them. They can vote for their representatives, 
influence their representatives, and even become their representatives. Majority rule is 
generally seen as the fairest way to decide disputed questions of social policy.56 The 
possibility of democratic governance leads to debate and deliberation, which also has an 
information-generating effect. 
Leaving general searches and seizures to the political process would allow a 
debate about the merits of the various policies to replace the dry legalese of the Court’s 
special needs opinions. The opportunities for participation and dialogue are especially 
strong in the general search context because the issues are ones everyone understands. 
Citizens do not need the acumen of a tax policy expert or a pensions expert to participate 
in the debate about appropriate searches and seizures. And because we trust legislatures 
to handle pensions and tax policy, we should also trust them to regulate these practices. 
 Fourth, legislatures can accommodate local variation in reasonableness. As the 
Court has observed in the equal protection context, “Questions of federalism are always 
inherent in the process of determining whether a State’s laws are to be accorded the 
traditional presumption of constitutionality, or are to be subjected instead to rigorous 
judicial scrutiny.”57 Allowing the Supreme Court to have the final say over the 
reasonableness of every general search or seizure imposes a hard and fast national 
baseline for general searches that may be considerably more protective than is 
reasonable, given the varying privacy preferences of the different states. This results in a 
                                                 
56 See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1388 (2006) 
(“Better than any other rule, [majority decision] is neutral as between the contested outcomes, treats 
participants equally, and gives each expressed opinion the greatest weight possible compatible with giving 
equal weight to all opinions”). 
57 Rodriguez, supra note 22, at 44. 
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suboptimal mix of police practices in particular jurisdictions. The lower federal courts 
cannot be relied upon to accommodate these regional variations because any disparity in 
their rulings appears as a “circuit split” that is subject to eventual correction by the 
Supreme Court. As Judge Easterbrook once noted, 
One glory of a federal society is that the people may choose for 
themselves not only laws but also law-enforcement methods. State A may 
employ extra police to follow a high-probability-of-detection and low-
sentence approach; State B may choose fewer police, fewer intrusions on 
privacy, but higher sentences for those who are caught. Each may be 
reasonable…If [a practice] strikes the wrong balance, the people may 
throw out of office those who adopted it.58 
 
Deferring to legislatures thus has this additional federalism-related benefit. Where there 
is a perceived interest in a national baseline, Congress would undoubtedly be able to 
provide such protection.59 Otherwise, the possibility of experimentation and 
accommodation to local variation must be counted as yet another reason why legislatures 
are better than courts at determining reasonableness.60 
 Fifth and finally, legislatures can adapt to changed circumstances. When courts 
determine reasonableness, the doctrine of stare decisis is a strong barrier to change. This 
leads to an exceedingly rigid set of constitutionalized rules.61 Many of the crucial 
decisions that still govern Fourth Amendment law were handed down almost forty years 
ago.62 Even in the 1970s, a federal judge could remark, “[T]here has not been the 
                                                 
58 Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 671 (1999). 
59 At the very least, Congress would have the authority to promulgate such standards for state police 
behavior through its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Fourth Amendment has 
been incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. So long as Congress made 
appropriate findings, it would have such authority under even the Court’s recent restrictions on the section 
5 power, because it would be prescribing rules for state officials rather than regulating state citizens 
directly. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619 (2000). 
60 See also Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 15, at 832 (suggesting that state legislatures should 
have the opportunity to experiment with different policing regimes). 
61 See McGowan, supra note 55, at 677. 
62 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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continuous re-examination of established methods, the periodic probing to see if the 
desired objective can be achieved through new exercises of ingenuity and imagination 
without sacrifice of other social ends.”63 Thirty years after that was written, we live in an 
Internet age with Fourth Amendment law developed for a wiretapping age. A court has to 
apply stare decisis to preserve its own legitimacy: when rules are described as 
constitutional, they come to be seen as mandated by the Constitution, rather than simply 
variable instantiations of a flexible reasonableness guarantee. Legislatures are not so 
restricted, and their ability to adapt to changed circumstances is yet another reason why 
they are better than courts at determining reasonableness. The timeless principle that 
courts should apply—the one protected by stare decisis—should be rational basis of 
general searches and seizures, unless one of the process failures discussed below is 
present. 
Responding to changed circumstances is especially important in an age of terror. 
Who knows what the future holds in terms of mass terror within the United States? Is the 
Court really willing to dictate what is reasonable for all time? If mass terror strikes, it 
might be disastrous to apply old precedents to determine what constitutes a reasonable 
general search or seizure.64 And lest this conjure up images of Korematsu: the courts can 
be trusted to prevent violations of civil liberties, including practices that discriminate 
against minorities or political dissidents, practices that vest excessive executive 
discretion, and practices that have no rational basis (see Part II, below). 
 In the end, this enumeration of the advantages of legislatures has merely 
confirmed what our basic faith in the ability of democracies to protect groups already told 
                                                 
63 McGowan, supra note 55, at 681. 
64 See Earls, supra note 44 (essentially reasoning by analogy from Vernonia to determine whether a drug 
test in a different context was reasonable). 
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us was true. In other areas of constitutional law, groups do not normally have their 
grievances redressed by courts. Those doctrines implicitly recognize that the collective 
action, uneven preference, and concentrated costs problems are not sufficiently acute to 
justify incurring the costs of judicial review: the loss in democratic legitimacy and the 
specter of unaccountable judges determining social policy. This Section has shown that 
allowing courts to second-guess legislatures is even less justified in the Fourth 
Amendment area. The Amendment guarantees only cost-effectiveness, a task that is 
normally entrusted to legislatures on a daily basis. And with good reason: legislatures can 
balance, collect facts, are more legitimate, and can accommodate regional and temporal 
variation. Conversely, when courts try to assess reasonableness, they are very likely to 
get it wrong. Given that the Court acknowledges in other areas of doctrine that groups 
can protect themselves, these competence-based advantages of legislatures make 
deference in the Fourth Amendment area even more appropriate. In the end, allowing 
courts to second-guess legislative authorization of general searches and seizures is, in the 
absence of a process flaw, simply inconsistent with democratic values. 
 
C. The political process is, if anything, likely to err in the direction of too few cost-
effective general searches and seizures 
 
 The previous two sections showed that there are good reasons to believe that any 
systematic error occasioned by the uneven preference, concentrated costs, and collective 
action problems are far outweighed by the advantages of deferring to legislatures 
authorizing general searches and seizures. In other areas of constitutional law, the Court 
has assumed that judicial review is not worth the trouble where groups are involved: the 
costs are sufficiently spread out that groups can be expected to protect their interests in 
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the political process. The case for deference is even more compelling in the Fourth 
Amendment arena because the deprivations are less serious and the guarantee only 
mandates cost-effectiveness. Further, legislatures are generally trusted to determine cost-
effectiveness in our democracy, precisely because they are good at it. They can balance 
costs and benefits, find facts, accommodate variation, and are trusted to resolve the 
competing concerns in a fair and equitable manner. Politics does not get things perfect, 
but where groups are involved, it is the best option we have. 
 The final reason why strict judicial review of general searches and seizures is 
unnecessary is that the political process should exhibit a bias in favor of too little 
searching and seizing of groups. The typical searched or seized group is medium-sized: 
the students subject to a drug test, or the people who ride the subway, or the people who 
drive cars on a particular highway. Public choice theory predicts that medium-sized 
groups like these should be the political actors best positioned to achieve their aims. They 
have numerous members, so they have the economies of scale that individuals lack. Yet 
the group is not so large that collective action and free rider problems are particularly 
acute.65 
If anything, then, the concern about leaving group searches and seizures to the 
political process would be that not enough searches and seizures get approved by the 
legislature. The benefits redound to the population as a whole and are largely invisible, 
while the costs are highly visible and concentrated on medium-sized groups that are 
particularly effective at achieving political gains. From the perspective of public choice 
                                                 
65 See Elhauge, supra note 17, at 39. 
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theory, groups who are searched or seized are disproportionately powerful.66 They can 
protect themselves, and by no means need the courts. 
 What empirical evidence exists on privacy protection through the political process 
shows that people who prefer more privacy are perfectly capable of organizing on behalf 
of their interests. The State of Florida, for example, has repeatedly refused to authorize 
cameras that photograph people who run red lights. Even though this is an extremely 
minor intrusion, a local paper reported that, “Critics say…the notion of government 
photographing drivers smacks too much of Big Brother in George Orwell’s 1984.”67 
Congress alone has provided significant protection for privacy interests in the knock and 
announce statute;68 the Wiretap Act;69 the PATRIOT Act;70 the Privacy Protection Act of 
1980;71 and the pen register statute.72 All provide more privacy protection than is 
constitutionally required. 
 Calls for privacy protection are also unusually likely to receive bipartisan support. 
The Wisconsin Assembly recently passed a bill with bi-partisan support that would make 
it illegal for government to require people to have an identification microchip implanted 
under their skin.73 Tellingly, the only exceptions to the bill are for people who cannot 
vote, and therefore receive no representation in the legislative process: registered sex 
                                                 
66 In addition, businesses on highways where a traffic stop slows traffic or businesses in airports where 
intrusive searches are contemplated have a direct interest in advocating on behalf of their customers. See 
United States v. Hartwell, 436 F.3d 174, 180 (2006) (Alito, J.) (“And the airlines themselves have a strong 
interest in protecting passengers from unnecessary annoyance and harassment.”). 
67 Carlos Moncada, Cities Seeking Loopholes to Use Red-Light Cameras, Tampa Tribune, August 11, 
2006, at 6. 
68 18 U.S.C. § 3109. 
69 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520. 
70 USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
71 42 U.S.C. § 200a (providing more protection than the Supreme Court did in interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)). 
72 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (requiring more protection from pen registers than the Supreme Court required under 
the Fourth Amendment in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)). 
73 Tom Sheehan, Schneider’s Odd Don’t-Chip-Me Bill Manages to Pass Assembly, Wisconsin State 
Journal, March 19, 2006, at D9. 
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offenders and children at the direction of their parents.74 Republicans and Democrats in 
the House are currently planning to introduce legislation that would require automakers 
to disclose the existence of black boxes in cars that record driving information for police 
and insurance companies, and to tell consumers how to disable them. Representative 
Capuano was reported as saying, “What’s next, a GPS in my suit jacket?”75 Finally, the 
ambient fear of terrorism has not abated privacy concerns in the least. In 2003, a 
bipartisan group in Congress joined to prevent the Pentagon from data-mining health, 
financial, and travel information from American citizens.76 Senator Leahy observed, “If 
there is one thing that should unite everybody, from the very conservative member to the 
very liberal member, it is a concern that our own government should not spy on law-
abiding citizens.”77 
The likelihood of voter engagement on privacy issues is particularly driven home 
by the vigorous recent debate in Congress and in the public sphere over the PATRIOT 
Act and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Most commentators focus on 
the supposed abridgements of civil liberties contained in these acts or their proposed uses 
or revisions. But the remarkable feature of these laws is that there is any support at all for 
the protection these laws afford. They go far beyond what the Court has required under 
the Fourth Amendment, and they have a very real cost to law enforcement interests. 
Further, this cost can be especially dire because these agencies are investigating terrorists 
who want to do nothing less than destroy the United States. Finally, the likelihood of 
ordinary citizens ever bearing any costs from the behavior prohibited by the statutes is 
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75 Rebecca Carr, Black Boxes in Autos Raises Privacy Concerns, Cox News Service, June 7, 2006. 
76 Adam Clymer, Congress Agrees to Bar Pentagon From Terror Watch of Americans, New York Times, 
February 12, 2003, at A1. 
77 Id. 
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remote: most ordinary people will never encounter a sneak and peek warrant under the 
PATRIOT Act, or be subject to a national security wiretap under FISA. 
If ordinary people really were not engaged in debates about the proper balance 
between privacy and law enforcement, these statutes simply would not exist. They protect 
virtually nothing of value to the ordinary person, and at a potentially steep cost. But not 
only do they exist: there is significant public support for strictly interpreting FISA and for 
restricting the scope of permissible activities under the PATRIOT Act.78 Some polls have 
almost 50% of Americans opposing some actions taken under one or the other act.79 
The police practices implicated by FISA and the PATRIOT Act affect very few 
ordinary citizens but give rise to heated political debate and legislative compromise. A 
fortiori, there should be even more vigorous participation in debates over general 
searches and seizures, which are both more local and more likely to affect ordinary 
citizens.80 The Supreme Court in Cleburne Living Center used similar reasoning to find 
that the mentally retarded are not entitled to suspect class status under the Equal 
Protection Clause. The Court observed that legislatures often provide protection for the 
mentally handicapped. This legislation, “which could hardly have occurred and survived 
without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically 
powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the 
lawmakers.”81 Similar to advocates for the retarded, privacy advocates have been 
perfectly capable of organizing and representing their interests. As a result, they do not 
                                                 
78 See, e.g., Republican Speaks Up, Leading Others to Challenge Wiretaps, New York Times, February 11, 
2006, at A1; Once-Lone Foe of PATRIOT Act Has Company, New York Times, December 19, 2005, at 
A1. 
79 See, e.g., Poll Finds U.S. Split Over Eavesdropping, Cnn.com, January 11, 2006 (reporting that 46% of 
Americans oppose the President’s warrantless domestic eavesdropping program). 
80 See also Stuntz, Political Constitution, supra note 15, at 795 (noting that there are large constituencies for 
many Fourth Amendment rules, for instance traffic stops, where 23 million people are stopped per year). 
81 Cleburne Living Ctr., supra note 21, at 445. 
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need protection from the political process, and legislatures should be allowed to reach a 
final resolution on general searches and seizures without strict scrutiny under the Fourth 
Amendment—at least in the absence of the potential process failures discussed below. 
 This Part has shown that strict scrutiny of general searches and seizures is 
inconsistent both with other areas of constitutional law and with the fundamental trust we 
place in legislatures to determine reasonableness or the social good. The subjects of 
general searches and seizures can be expected to protect their interests in the political 
process. Their interests will receive a full airing. Then the legislature can weigh the costs 
and benefits, and approve the practice only if the benefits exceed the costs. 
The legislature may not achieve a perfect balance, for all the reasons discussed 
above. But our instinctive confidence in democracy and self-government tell us that the 
long-term legislative balance will be better than any other that could be achieved, or any 
that a court might impose. The Court’s other constitutional doctrine implies it: the Court 
defers to legislative decisionmaking affecting groups in situations implicating far more 
absolute values than the cost-effectiveness guarantee of the Fourth Amendment. The 
competence of legislatures in balancing, finding facts, and adapting to changed 
circumstances confirms our trust. And the collective action problems that result in a 
systematic bias in favor of privacy advocates seal the deal. Intrusive judicial review 
promises only to empower idiosyncratic dissenters through conducting reasonableness 
review of general searches and seizures. Our trust in the power of groups should convince 
us that it is normally not necessary for a court to intervene. 
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II. A role for courts: policing general searches and seizures for process failures 
 
 It is far from the case, however, that all general searches and seizures should be 
constitutional. Rather, they should be constitutional unless courts have a good, 
democracy-enhancing reason for subjecting them to intrusive review. Instead of 
reviewing all general searches and seizures de novo, courts would take steps to ensure 
that legislatures make as many of the important decisions as possible, and pick up the 
slack where the legislature fails to make a decision or makes a decision in a way that does 
not allow everyone to be heard. Judicial review of these practices under the Fourth 
Amendment would thus simply resemble what the courts already do under the equal 
protection, due process, and takings clauses. Judges would strictly scrutinize (that is, 
reweigh costs and benefits) only when they can identify one of these flaws that prevented 
some group from being heard or represented in the political process. This Part does not 
pretend to enumerate all the possible process failures, but merely intends to show that the 
scope of intrusive judicial review should be tailored to particular problems, and narrower 
than it currently is. 
 
A. No legislative authorization 
 
 First, a court should apply strict scrutiny if neither a state legislature nor Congress 
has explicitly endorsed the practice. Requiring legislative approval ensures that the 
relevant interests in liberty, privacy, and security have been weighed in an open, 
deliberative, and representative process. It ensures that the affected groups have had an 
opportunity to voice their concerns, organize, and achieve representation. When 
executive or administrative officials embark upon an independent program of general 
searches, courts cannot be sure that there has been representation, deliberation, or 
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balancing. The independent decisions of such agents thus should not necessarily be 
entitled to deference under the Fourth Amendment. 
The decisions of local representative bodies such as school boards or city councils 
also might not receive the same degree of deference as legislatures. Local bodies can 
generate externalities. A city council, for example, represents only city residents. It thus 
might approve checkpoint stops that inefficiently impose externalities on drivers in the 
county, who also use city streets, but who may have different privacy preferences and no 
voice in city politics. Legislatures internalize the relevant costs of general searches and 
seizures. The legislature encompasses both city drivers and county drivers. Legislatures 
in general encompass entire communities, and are accordingly more likely to represent all 
of the relevant interests. 
But local representative bodies do have an advantage over legislatures: it is more 
difficult for groups that bear costs to block cost-effective general searches and seizures. 
In a smaller population and at a local level, the benefits are relatively more concentrated 
and visible (more drug free schools, less narcotics trafficking, etc.). It is thus more likely 
that the beneficiaries can stand firm against the organized interests of people who might 
be adversely affected by the search. This is undoubtedly why the vast majority of general 
searches that have come to the courts have been authorized not by a legislature but by a 
local representative body.82 Indeed, the Court has already relied on approval by local 
bodies in upholding general searches and seizures. In Vernonia School District 47J v. 
Acton, the Court approved a program of random, suspicionless drug tests of athletes in 
part because “[t]he record shows no objection to this districtwide program by any parents 
                                                 
82 See, e.g., Earls, supra note 44; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); City of 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000); Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San 
Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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other than the couple before us here—even though, as we have described, a public 
meeting was held to obtain parents’ views.”83 Because of this school board approval, the 
Court found “insufficient basis to contradict the judgment of Vernonia’s parents [and] its 
school board…as to what was reasonably in the interest of these children under the 
circumstances.”84 
It is important to note, however, that because of the two competing effects, it is 
unclear whether local representative bodies should receive deference. The possibility of 
externalities is higher, but they are also better positioned to weigh the relevant costs and 
benefits in a fair and deliberative manner.85 The Court would ultimately have to decide 
this question. But it is quite clear that if the Court has been willing to defer to a certain 
extent to local bodies, then a fortiori it should be willing to defer to legislatures. 
Legislatures do not have the externality problem. And if anything, they will approve too 
few general searches and seizures, because of the affected groups’ enhanced ability to 
mobilize against a diffuse group of beneficiaries who experience only intangible benefits. 
 Regardless of which bodies should ultimately receive deference, the authorization 
requirement ensures that the affected groups have received representation in an open and 
deliberative forum. Lack of legislative authorization was the real problem in one of the 
                                                 
83 Vernonia, supra note 82, at 665. 
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85 Professors Kahan and Meares have latched onto the advantages, proposing to allow sub-communities like 
housing complexes to opt out of Fourth Amendment protections: for instance, to allow police officers to 
conduct searches of apartments on less than probable cause. See Kahan and Meares, supra note 1. Their 
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combating crime. In other words; the decision of a third imposes externalities on the other two-thirds. Thus 
even though the building might internalize the costs to its own residents, it might not internalize the costs to 
the entire neighborhood of opting out. The proposal thus does not guarantee a politically meaningful 
balancing of costs and benefits, and the decisions of such bodies should not necessarily be entitled to 
deference. 
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Court’s recent general search cases that was decided on a different ground. In Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston, local city and hospital officials, frustrated with efforts to get 
pregnant mothers off crack, decided to put teeth into the program by sending the results 
of suspicionless tests to law enforcement officials for criminal prosecution.86 The Court 
invalidated the program, holding that a general search or seizure can never have crime 
control as its immediate purpose. This was a weak rationale, as will be discussed below 
in Part III. But the search was problematic nonetheless. This important question of social 
policy had been made unilaterally by local officials, many of whom were unelected, and 
all of whom were not required to deliberate or take views on the options. Their final 
decision thus went untested by debate, deliberation, and representation. Furthermore, 
their decision was highly debatable as a matter of policy. At the Court, amici—including 
the American Medical Association—persuasively argued that the get-tough policy was 
counterproductive, as the criminal sanction would likely cause crack-addicted mothers 
not to seek any medical care at all, to the detriment of mother and child.87 
The debatable wisdom of the policy was still no reason to withdraw it from 
legislative purview, for all time. If a legislature had authorized the policy, it would have 
represented a judgment that the policy was reasonable, and should have been entitled to 
deference. Justice Scalia recognized this principle in his dissent. He argued that “[t]he 
Constitution does not resolve all difficult social questions, but leaves the vast majority of 
them to resolution by debate and the democratic process—which would produce a 
decision by the citizens of Charleston, through their elected representatives, to forbid or 
                                                 
86 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 72 (2001). 
87 See id. at 84 n.23 (citing briefs from AMA, APHA, and NARAL). 
 40
permit the police action at issue here.”88 But then he failed to apply the principle 
correctly. No representative body—not even a local one—had considered or approved the 
policy in this case. The Court thus should have invalidated the program on that ground, 
while leaving it open for the citizens of South Carolina to adopt the policy if they 
believed it was effective. In the ensuring debate, the AMA and NARAL could have 
presented their expert concerns—effectively representing the interests of the crack-
addicted mothers and their children. Instead of taking this democracy-enhancing tack, the 
Court found that such a policy is always unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, 
enshrining a principle that is, for reasons discussed in Part III, dubious from a political 
process perspective. 
 The legislative authorization requirement prevents most of the counter-examples 
that are typically arrayed against the political process approach. Any general search or 
seizure that seems terribly unreasonable (like requiring all Americans to register or wear 
serial numbers) could never come to pass—absent some calamity that might actually 
justify it. It is exceedingly difficult to pass a general search and seizure policy, precisely 
because the affected groups have such an organizational advantage. 
That is why the vast majority of general searches and seizures that seem troubling 
are adopted by officials freelancing in the field. For example, in Michigan a teacher 
unilaterally decided to strip search 20 members of a class to discover a few stolen 
dollars.89 It would suffice to dispose of cases like this for courts to find a lack of 
legislative authorization. One cannot imagine that parents of schoolchildren, a politically 
powerful group, would ever authorize such a practice. But if strip searches of 
                                                 
88 Id. at 92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
89 Beard v. Whitmore Lack Sch. Dist., 402 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 41
schoolchildren ever became essential to the citizens of Michigan—that is, if they seemed 
reasonable—citizens would retain the option to approve them. In the normal course of 
events, that would never happen, precisely because the practice is unreasonable. 
Legislatures can be trusted to register that instinctively correct judgment.90 If anything, as 
public choice theory teaches, they will approve too few general searches and seizures. 
 
B. Excessive executive discretion 
 A court should also strictly scrutinize a general search or seizure when the 
legislature approves it but gives executive officials discretion on how to apply it. For 
instance, a legislature might approve a drug testing scheme but allow executive officials 
to choose how and who to test. This is problematic from a political process perspective 
because it passes the buck. The legislature abdicates responsibility for making the 
important value choices, short-circuiting the relationship between the representative 
process and the final choice. The officials who end up making the decisions—often 
politically unaccountable and isolated from public scrutiny—may make decisions about 
whom to target for arbitrary reasons unrelated to the values underlying the legislative 
scheme. 
Police officers, for example, are unelected, their decisions are made at a low level, 
and their decisions are often not a matter of public record. Given the discretion to choose 
how and to whom the scheme is applied, they may choose based on arbitrary reasons. 
Most troubling, officers might arbitrarily impose burdens on discrete and insular 
                                                 
90 For laudable examples of cases where the Court of Appeals disposed of a case by finding that the 
legislature had not authorized the search at issue rather than by finding that the search violated the Fourth 
Amendment, see United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (invalidating suspicionless 
search of commercial vehicle because it was one pound under legislative authorization) and United States 
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minorities—imposing burdens that might become entrenched because those minorities do 
not have recourse to the political system to redress their grievances. Thus, when a 
legislative scheme vests officials with discretion, courts are justified in conducting an 
independent balancing of costs and benefits to make sure that the program is being 
executed in a reasonable manner.91 Conversely, when executive officials have no 
discretion under a scheme, courts can be sure that the legislature has made the important 
value choices, and that decision is entitled to respect. 
 The problem of executive discretion (and especially police discretion) is why 
judges generally must apply strict scrutiny to police practices under the Fourth 
Amendment. Discretionary police activity is extremely necessary: legislatures cannot 
resolve to target Drug Dealer Johnson. But because a legislature has not (and cannot) 
authorize the targeting decision, courts must make sure that the action is in fact 
reasonable. 
This was how Ely in Democracy and Distrust explained why searching judicial 
review is the norm under the Fourth Amendment. He recognized that the requirements of 
warrant and probable cause are important means for ensuring that executive decisions to 
search and seize are globally reasonable: 
The warrant requirement injects the judgment of a ‘neutral and detached’ 
magistrate and also has what may be the more important effect of 
compelling a contemporaneous recordation of the factors on whose basis 
the action is being taken. The probable cause requirement obviously can’t 
guarantee a lack of arbitrariness: invidious choices among those respecting 
whom there is probable cause are possible. By setting a substantive 
parameter at one end of the decision, however, it at least requires that 
                                                 
91 See Klarman, supra note 1, at 765 (“A credible political process theory must not only superintend the 
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persons not be singled out for arrest or search in the absence of strong 
indication of guilt.92 
 
In essence, the court-imposed warrant and probable cause requirements ensure that 
executive decisions to search and seize are, on the whole, reasonable. Probable cause 
ensures that the officers generally must have a very good reason to search, and the 
warrant requirement ensures compliance with the probable cause requirement. Because 
police officers often retain a good deal of discretion in conducting criminal 
investigations, free of legislative superintendence, courts will generally have an important 
role in defining reasonableness in the context of everyday law enforcement.93 
 The element of executive discretion is absent, however, in the prototypical 
general search approved by a legislature. The legislature says “drug test all 
schoolchildren” or “stop every tenth motorist at stop 125 on I-40.” There is nothing left 
for officials to decide: the legislature has weighed the options and made the relevant 
choices. The courts must make sure that officials comply with their mandate. But beyond 
that, courts should limit themselves to applying rational basis review to the legislature’s 
balancing of costs and benefits, for all the reasons discussed in Part I. 
 There are of course degrees of executive discretion, and the courts must be the 
arbiters of how much is too much. The Supreme Court has already dealt with the problem 
of excessive executive discretion in a number of general search cases. At one extreme is 
Delaware v. Prouse.94 There the police officer claimed the authority to stop any car at 
any time, regardless of suspicion, to check for safety violations. The Court identified the 
classic problem of executive discretion: “we cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon 
                                                 
92 Ely, supra note 4, at 172-3. 
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94 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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which a patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would 
be more productive than stopping any other driver.”95 Moreover, it is very easy to 
imagine many pernicious reasons why an officer might stop a car: the race of the driver, 
or the color of the car, for example. The Court was thus quite right to impose a minimum 
level of suspicion in this case to ensure that the officer’s reasons for stopping a car more 
or less matched up with society’s reasons for allowing cars to be stopped. That is, the 
suspicion requirement ensures that officers are stopping the cars for the right reasons: to 
prevent traffic law violations, and not to harass drivers.96 
 Camara v. Municipal Court is another case of excessive officer discretion.97 In 
Camara, officers had the authority to inspect any home for safety violations without 
suspicion. The problem was that officers could choose, for any reason or no reason at all, 
to search any home or business an arbitrary number of times. This had the potential to 
impose burdens on certain home or business owners that were not justified by the need to 
conduct safety inspections. As the Court observed, “The practical effect of this system is 
to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the official in the field.”98 A practice 
that seems globally reasonable—allowing safety inspections to enforce an administrative 
scheme—might end up being unreasonable in the application. The problem in this case, 
however, was that requiring individualized suspicion as in Prouse would have rendered 
the whole scheme ineffective: once suspicion of a safety violation develops, it is often too 
late to prevent catastrophic damage. 
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The Court solved the problem by taking advantage of the power groups wield in 
the political process. The Court imposed a requirement of area-wide probable cause: in 
the terminology of Bill Stuntz, it converted potential takings into taxes. The requirement 
could be satisfied by showing that inspection of an area was justified by the passing of 
time or its condition.99 This ensured that officers would not burden individual 
homeowners, and if they unjustly burdened groups, they could redress any grievances 
through the political process. The Court thus achieved a workable balance, minimizing 
the risk of uneven application, while enabling the fulfillment of the statutory purpose. 
 The Court’s trust in the power of groups to resist unreasonable searches and 
seizures was also evident in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte.100 Here the Court said it 
was permissible for executive officials to select the location of an immigration traffic 
stop checkpoint. The Court observed that 
The location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, 
but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most 
effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that 
such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears 
arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class. And since field officers 
may stop only those cars passing the checkpoint, there is less room for 
abusive or harassing stops of individuals than there was in the case of 
roving-patrol stops.101 
 
According to the Court, then, two things made this exercise of discretion reasonable. 
First, the policymaking officials had no reason to use the stops for harassment and were 
politically accountable, which meant there was less reason to distrust exercises of their 
discretion. Second, the affected class was politically powerful. The Court trusted groups 
of motorists to be able to protect their interests in the political process. These factors 
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combined meant it was exceedingly improbable that executive officials would abuse their 
discretion, and ensured compliance with the purpose of the legislative scheme. 
Finally, New York v. Burger represents the apex of executive discretion under the 
Court’s suspicionless search decisions.102 There the Court allowed officials to make 
unannounced, suspicionless searches of junkyards for compliance with a regulatory 
scheme. Officers in the field retained a great deal of discretion because the scheme placed 
no limits on the number of inspections that could be conducted in a certain period.103 
There was thus a risk of officials differentially burdening of junkyards based on arbitrary 
considerations. 
 This was a questionable case from a political process perspective. Neither of the 
factors that made the searches in Martinez-Fuerte reasonable was present. The discretion 
lay with officers in the field rather than politically accountable policymakers. And those 
officers had the ability to burden individual businesses rather than groups. The possibility 
of abuse of discretion was therefore very real, as Justice Brennan pointed out in 
dissent.104 It is troubling that politically unaccountable officers in the field were allowed 
to make unreviewable decisions about which junkyards would be burdened under the 
legislative scheme, and Burger very well may have been wrong for this reason. 
 Martinez-Fuerte should be the model for courts deciding whether a scheme vests 
executives with too much discretion. Searches are least problematic when executive 
officials retain no discretion: as when a legislature specifies that everyone in a certain 
group should undergo random periodic drug tests. Searches should also pass muster when 
the discretion is in politically accountable officials who are only allowed to burden 
                                                 
102 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
103 Id. at 711 n.21. 
104 Id. at 722 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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groups and who are given guidelines on how to exercise their discretion. A legislature 
could, for instance, allow a mayor to designate which stretch of highway is most prone to 
narcotics trafficking and thus needs a narcotics interdiction roadblock; or which schools 
have drug problems justifying random drug testing, according to some neutral and 
reliable measure reviewable by courts. But legislatures should not be allowed to vest 
unaccountable officers in the field with the discretion to burden individuals, as in Prouse, 
Camara, and Marshall. 
This approach to executive discretion has analogues in other areas of 
constitutional doctrine influenced by process theory. The preference for burdening groups 
rather than isolated individuals of course is a theme in equal protection doctrine. As 
Justice Jackson once noted, “[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as 
to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation 
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger 
numbers were affected.”105 And the emphasis on legislatures making the important 
decisions about who gets searched and seized comports with the Court’s vagueness 
doctrine under the Due Process Clause. That doctrine works to prevent legislatures from 
allowing lower-level, politically unaccountable police officers define crimes through the 
application of extremely broad criminal statutes.106 
Where the legislature does make the important choices about a scheme of general 
searches and seizures, the courts should normally defer to that judgment as presumptively 
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reasonable. By applying a jurisprudence of executive discretion, courts can make sure 
that legislatures strike the relevant balance between liberty and security, while leaving 
them free to reach balances that are in fact reasonable.107 Legislatures should be allowed 
to delegate to a limited extent in order to make their schemes work, but only when 
appropriate safeguards like those in Martinez-Fuerte are in place. Where they delegate 
too much, courts will remain to conduct de novo review and determine whether 
executives’ decisions are ultimately reasonable. 
 
C. Discrimination against discrete and insular minorities 
 The third major process flaw that might give rise to strict review of general 
searches and seizures is discrimination against discrete and insular minorities. A minority 
is discrete and insular if it is somehow blocked from accessing the political process. As a 
result, the members’ interests go unrepresented, and prejudiced or unthinking majorities 
may force them to bear unjustifiably heavy burdens. The risk of disproportionate 
burdening of these minorities is one reason why executive discretion to search and seize 
is so troubling.108 But legislative burdening of these minorities is also troubling: because 
these groups go unrepresented, the legislature is not bound to consider their interests or 
respect them as persons. The political process does not provide a remedy for these 
groups, so reweighing of costs and benefits is justified.109 
                                                 
107 Cases that would come out the same way, but for different reasons, under this approach include Collins 
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109 See Carolene Products, supra note 7, at 152 n.4; Ely, supra note 4, at 157. 
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 A general search most clearly burdens a discrete and insular minority when it 
targets people who go completely unrepresented in the political process. Policies that 
target prisoners, aliens, and others who lack both the franchise and effective practical 
representation run the risk of concentrating undue burdens.110 These groups do not even 
have the potential to organize to protect their interests, so the courts must independently 
weigh the reasonableness of a general search or seizure as applied to them, even if the 
legislature authorized it.111 But school children do not qualify: they have practical 
representation because their parents can be relied upon to represent their interests.112 
 A general search also burdens a discrete and insular minority when it singles out a 
racial, ethnic, or religious minority: for example, when it targets “all Muslims” for a 
general search. Intentional discrimination is troubling from a political process perspective 
because it concentrates costs. When searches are defined according to neutral criteria—
the location of a checkpoint stop, or the drug testing of an entire school system—costs are 
spread and there are likely to be no permanent winners or losers. Everyone goes to school 
at some point, and everyone drives at some point. The majority can safely be said to 
internalize the cost of searching and seizing. But when searches are defined by reference 
to immutable personal characteristics not shared by the majority, costs are concentrated. 
The majority knows that it can achieve the benefits of the search without bearing any of 
the costs. This is essentially an extreme form of the criticism adverted to in Part I: that 
legislatures cannot be trusted to weigh reasonableness because not everyone is affected 
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a ‘discrete and insular minority.’”). 
111 An example is N.G. ex rel. S.C. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 2004) (invalidating legislatively 
authorized policy of strip-searching girls in juvenile facility). These girls are not practically represented 
because, as social outcasts, their interests are not necessarily aligned with those of their parents. 
112 See Kahan and Meares, supra note 1, at 1173. 
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by a given general search policy. Thus, while it is perhaps incorrect to call racial and 
religious minorities “discrete and insular,” since they possess the franchise and wield 
significant political power, intentional discrimination still counts as a process flaw. Equal 
protection and free exercise doctrine clearly recognize this: laws that intentionally 
discriminate against racial or religious minorities are subject to strict scrutiny.113 In the 
Fourth Amendment context, courts should also invalidate general searches that target 
racial or religious minorities. 
 General search and seizure policies might also differentially burden racial or 
religious groups without being intentionally directed at them. For example, imagine a 
narcotics interdiction checkpoint placed in a high-crime neighborhood. The checkpoint 
would have a neutral and legitimate purpose: stopping the flow of narcotics traffic. But it 
might have a disparate impact. Minority communities tend to have more crime than non-
minority communities. Thus a checkpoint situated to stop crime will end up stopping 
minorities at a rate greater than their proportion in the population. The question is 
whether the political process is sufficient to protect the privacy interests of minorities 
who are disproportionately affected by the checkpoint. 
 The answer is probably yes. So long as the affected groups have access to the 
polls, there is no reason why they cannot protect their interests, just as any other medium-
sized group could. The political process dangers of intentional discrimination are much 
more muted. The legislature made the choice on neutral grounds, rather than on the basis 
of prejudice. And the majority now no longer has the opportunity to get something for 
nothing. The costs are spread more broadly: there is a disparate impact on minorities, but 
because the search is not based on minority status, it also impacts some members of the 
                                                 
113 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990). 
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majority who are subject to the search. This means that the majority has a far greater 
interest in striking a correct balance between the costs and benefits of the general search 
practice. 
Moreover, public choice theory predicts that in this situation, minority groups 
should be quite capable of protecting their interests. The theory shows that medium-sized 
groups—like minorities affected by a disparate impact search—should have 
disproportionately large power in the political process. As Einer Elhauge observes, 
“Interest group theory…suggests that such intensely interested minorities will face less 
severe free rider problems in forming a political organization. This collective action 
advantage should sometimes enable the intensely interested minority to achieve political 
success that is socially desirable.”114 This result fits with our perceptions about the power 
of racial and religious minorities, who certainly wield substantial political power in 
today’s society, and often hold the balance of power in closely disputed elections.115 The 
disparate impact result also accords with the Court’s equal protection decision in 
Washington v. Davis, where it held that disparate impact alone does not trigger strict 
scrutiny;116 as well as the Court’s free exercise decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 
which held the same for laws that differentially burden religious minorities.117 
Furthermore, precisely because of the history of racial prejudice in this country, and the 
positive legacy of historical events like the Civil Rights Movement, majorities can be 
expected to be solicitous of minorities’ concerns about general searches. As the majority 
in Smith noted, 
                                                 
114 Elhauge, supra note 17, at 64. 
115 See Kahan and Meares, supra note 1, at 1167 (noting that many minority communities support policing 
practices that have a disparate impact because they help to make their neighborhoods safer). 
116 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
117 Smith, supra note 113. 
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Values that are protected against government interference through 
enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the 
political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection 
accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that 
affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society 
that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be 
expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well.…But to 
say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or 
even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and 
that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the 
courts.118 
 
 But Washington v. Davis and Employment Division v. Smith are not without their 
critics. And Fourth Amendment law need not look exactly like equal protection law or 
free exercise law. Disparate impact might be especially troubling in the police context. 
There is a history of racial injustice in policing in this country. Because of this history, 
and because of racial problems in policing today, disparate impact general searches and 
seizures might be thought to pose a particularly severe risk of stigmatic harms.119 For 
these reasons, it would be perfectly legitimate for the Court to expand strict scrutiny of 
general searches and seizures to include those that have a disproportionate racial or 
religious impact.120 Even this relatively expansive interpretation would be far better than 
                                                 
118 Id. at 890. 
119 For example, the phenomenon of racial profiling or “driving while black” is one of the major factors 
tending to decrease the legitimacy of law enforcement in the eyes of minority communities today. Some of 
this is attributable to the Court’s own jurisprudence, which in a move that itself denigrates political process 
values declined to establish stricter scrutiny of racially charged police practices in Whren v. United States, 
supra note 38. For scholarly commentary, see David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When 
Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 Ind. L.J. 659, 660 (1994) (arguing that “stops and frisks are 
applied disproportionately to the poor, to African Americans, and to Hispanic Americans…This begins and 
perpetuates a cycle of mistrust and suspicion, a feeling that law enforcement harasses African Americans 
and Hispanic Americans with Terry stops as a way of controlling their communities”). For news accounts, 
see, e.g., Fletcher, Driven to Extremes, Washington Post, March 29, 1996 (noting that “[m]any African 
American men suspect that police single them out for stops and searches, and statistics, where they exist, 
show that blacks are stopped more frequently than whites”); Schneider, State police I-95 drug unit found to 
search black motorists 4 times more often than white, Baltimore Sun, May 23, 1996; Whitman Admits 
Police Used Race in Turnpike Stops, New York Times, April 21, 1999, at B1. 
120 Prof. Amar has proposed something like this. See Amar, supra note 12, at 807 (“Even if racially 
disparate impact alone does not violate the Constitution, surely equal protection principles call for concern 
when blacks bear the brunt of a government search or seizure policy...As long as courts organize Fourth 
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today’s one-size-fits-all approach to general searches and seizures. It would still leave the 
vast majority of searches and seizures—which do not have a disparate impact—to the 
legislative process. In short, judicial review should be tailored to the potential ways the 
political process might go awry. Where there is not even a colorable chance that a 
practice burdens a discrete and insular minority, the courts should apply rational basis 
review. 
 
D. No rational basis 
 
 A general search or seizure should also be invalid if it has no rational basis. 
Where the reasonableness of the policy is not even debatable, it is not entitled to 
deference. In such a case, the application of the “reasonableness” requirement of the 
Fourth Amendment is not doubtful, and political process theory thus does not quarrel 
with invalidating the legislative judgment. 
The Court’s equal protection and due process cases have shown that the rational 
basis standard is not toothless. In Cleburne Living Center, the Court found that a zoning 
regulation that prohibited a home for the mentally retarded but allowed boarding houses, 
hospitals, and fraternity houses had no rational basis.121 The Court also applied rational 
basis review in Lawrence v. Texas to find that a law criminalizing same-sex sodomy was 
irrational.122 
In the Fourth Amendment context, rational basis review offends no political 
process values because a court is not performing a plastic reweighing of costs and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Amendment discourse around warrants, probable cause, and exclusion, rather than reasonableness, this 
open engagement of race will likely not occur in Fourth Amendment case law”). 
121 Cleburne Living Ctr., supra note 21. 
122 Lawrence, 539 US 558 (2003). 
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benefits to invalidate a legislative judgment. Rather, it is finding that no rational 
legislature could have approved the policy. By contrast, if the reasonableness of the 
policy is at all debatable, a legislature is in the better position to decide, for all the 
reasons discussed in Part I above. 
 
E. Violation of an independent constitutional provision 
 This final exception might appear obvious. But it bears emphasizing. Courts too 
often move directly to find a Fourth Amendment violation when the conduct is clearly 
prohibited under another amendment. The troubling aspect of the general search or 
seizure is not the practice itself, but rather its impingement on other constitutional values. 
A general search or seizure thus might very well offend the equal protection, due process, 
free exercise, cruel and unusual punishment, or free speech clauses, even if it has been 
authorized by a legislature. 
 A good example of such a case comes from the Eleventh Circuit. In Bourgeois v. 
Peters, the court considered a policy that required protestors near the School of the 
Americas site in Georgia to submit to a magnetometer search at a checkpoint a few 
blocks away—a search that would have delayed the protest for one or two hours.123 The 
search clearly violated the First Amendment. In fact, according to the court, it violated it 
“in five ways,” including unbridled discretion, prior restraint, impermissible content-
based regulation, unreasonable time place and manner restriction, and unconstitutional 
condition.124 
                                                 
123 Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2004). 
124 Id. at 1316. 
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For that matter, the policy also violated the legislative authorization, executive 
discretion, and rational basis canons discussed above. The legislature had not authorized 
the searches. Even if it had, officers in the field had full discretion to pick which 
gatherings would be subject to magnetometer screens.125 And the policy had no rational 
basis. The town did not subject any other similarly large and potentially volatile 
gatherings (such as sporting events) to magnetometer screens. Furthermore, the isolated 
instances of violence at previous School of the Americas protests had nothing to do with 
metal objects that could be detected by a magnetometer.126 There was thus good reason to 
think the officials were targeting these political protesters, and no fewer than eight ways 
to dispose of this case without holding that such general searches were forever foreclosed 
as a matter of constitutional law. 
 But that is not what the court did. Instead, it held that such general searches were 
always impermissible under the Constitution because 
[t]he text of the Fourth Amendment contains no exception for large 
gatherings of people…[T]he Fourth Amendment embodies a value 
judgment by the Framers that prevents us from gradually trading ever-
increasing amounts of freedom and privacy for additional security. It 
establishes searches based on evidence—rather than potentially effective, 
broad, prophylactic dragnets—as the constitutional norm.127 
 
The court thus would always require officers to have some suspicion before subjecting 
participants at a rally to a magnetometer screen. 
 The Bourgeois court’s claims about original meaning will be dealt with in Part IV 
below. For now, it is enough to see that its general Fourth Amendment principle 
establishing a presumption against general searches and seizures was far too broad. 
                                                 
125 See id. at 1318. 
126 Id. at 1322. 
127 Id. at 1311-12. 
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Where the search implicates First Amendment concerns—as these political protests did—
the courts should certainly apply strict scrutiny and re-balance the costs and benefits of 
the general search or seizure at issue. Applying relaxed scrutiny might allow majorities to 
impede political minorities and thus clog avenues for change. But the courts should not 
use the Fourth Amendment as a categorical bar against general suspicionless searches and 
seizures. Absent the process flaws described in this Part—no legislative authorization, 
excessive executive discretion, discrimination against discrete and insular minorities, no 
rational basis, or violation of independent constitutional provision—the courts should 
uphold the practice. And unlike the Bourgeois court, they should use the narrowest 
ground available to avoid chilling cost-effective general searches. The groups affected by 
such neutral and generally applicable searches and seizures can be expected to protect 
their interests in the political process, and the legislature can be trusted to reach an 
appropriate compromise of the values and interests involved. 
 The process failures described in this Part should form the basis for a new 
doctrine of general searches and seizures. The courts should apply two tiers of review. If 
the practice exhibits one of these process failures—no authorization, executive discretion, 
discrimination, no rational basis, or violation of an independent provision—the court 
should apply strict scrutiny. That does not necessarily mean that the court should 
invalidate the search. Rather, it means that the court should reweigh the costs and benefits 
and uphold the search only if it seems reasonable to the court. If none of these process 
failures are present, on the other hand, the court should apply rational basis review. The 
practice should stand if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental 
purpose. As demonstrated by the other areas of constitutional doctrine, the relative 
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competence of legislatures in balancing costs and benefits, and the collective action 
problem that leads to a bias in favor of too little searching, courts can trust the political 
process to handle searches and seizures affecting groups. So long as a rational legislature 
could have thought the practice necessary, judges should not be in the business of 
imposing their views of reasonableness on the population, when the affected groups are 
perfectly capable of protecting their interests through the political process. 
 
III. The democracy-impeding effects of current general search and seizure doctrine 
 The previous Parts have outlined a new, process-based theory of general searches 
and seizures. General suspicionless searches should be entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality, so long as they are approved by a legislature, have a rational basis, do 
not vest executive discretion, and do not discriminate. As shown above, the Court has 
recognized that groups do not need protection from the political process in equal 
protection, due process, free exercise, and takings law. A survey of doctrine shows that 
this is inexplicably not the case in the Fourth Amendment context. The Court permits 
many general suspicionless searches and seizures.128 But it has set up a number of 
artificial roadblocks on the way to approving a general search. 
No brief treatment could summarize the whole of suspicionless search and seizure 
doctrine, which encompasses administrative searches, inventory searches, border 
searches, special needs searches, checkpoint searches, probationer searches, and perhaps 
more.129 This Part will simply treat the most objectionable features of current doctrine. 
                                                 
128 See, e.g., Earls, supra note 44; Vernonia, supra note 82; Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 37. 
129 Even some Courts of Appeals have difficulty discerning how the doctrines all fit together. Witness the 
recent debate over whether suspicionless DNA testing of convicted felons fits in the special needs or the 
probationer search category. See, e.g., United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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First, the Court often requires that the search or seizure not be conducted for a general 
law enforcement purpose, such as criminal investigation. Second, the Court often requires 
that the search be conducted for some special need; and legislative approval by no means 
automatically qualifies the need as special. Finally, the Court often requires an 
independent, de novo assessment of reasonableness rather than rational basis review of 
costs and benefits. This Part shows that all three requirements are unjustified on a 
political process rationale. 
 
A. First requirement: no general searches or seizures for the purpose of criminal 
investigation 
 
 In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Court struck down a traffic checkpoint 
whose purpose was to interdict illegal narcotics.130 The stops were conducted on a 
random basis: that is, executive officials had no discretion to stop cars, but could only 
stop a predetermined number according to a predetermined scheme.131 The stops lasted 
for no more than five minutes per car, and consent was necessary to do more than a dog 
sniff of the car (which, according to the Court’s precedents, does not constitute an 
independent search).132 Except for the fact that the Indiana legislature had not authorized 
the program, the Fourth Amendment should have no problem with the checkpoint. It 
affected drivers: a large, neutrally defined group of people whose interests are well-
represented in the political process. There was no executive discretion that could have 
                                                 
130 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000). 
131 Id. at 35. 
132 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
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arbitrarily concentrated burdens on individuals, and there was no illicit discrimination.133 
Further, the program clearly had a rational basis: a legislature could reasonably believe 
that it is appropriate to curtail the supply of drugs to a major city by targeting the major 
supply route. The program thus had all the hallmarks of reasonableness. 
 The Court, however, did not rely on the narrow ground of no legislative 
authorization. It found that because the primary purpose of the checkpoint was ordinary 
crime control, the program could never be valid under the Fourth Amendment.134 The 
opinion relied mainly on the fact that the Court had never before approved a suspicionless 
search with a crime control purpose. The Court’s primary rationale was that “[w]ithout 
drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general interest in crime 
control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming 
a routine part of American life.”135 
                                                 
133 One reply might be that criminals are a suspect class, the search intentionally targets them, and thus 
strict scrutiny is appropriate under the “discrete and insular minorities” exception. But criminals are clearly 
not a suspect class. Criminal status is not an immutable personal characteristic, like race or religion, that 
gives rise to situations where majorities bear no costs while helpless minorities bear them all. Criminal 
status is a choice. And a socially disfavored one at that. Criminal laws burden criminals, but we do not 
subject them to strict scrutiny. Furthermore, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the Court has long 
held that the interests of criminals have no bearing on the reasonableness determination. See Trupiano v. 
United States, 334 U.S. 699, 709 (1948) (“The Fourth Amendment was designed to protect both the 
innocent and the guilty from unreasonable intrusions upon their right of privacy, while leaving adequate 
room for the necessary processes of law enforcement”); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 
(1948) (noting that the Amendment is not meant “to shield criminals nor to make the home a safe haven for 
illegal activities”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990) (noting that the 
Amendment “prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures whether or not the evidence is sought to be used 
in a criminal trial, and a violation of the Amendment is fully accomplished at the time of an unreasonable 
governmental intrusion”). See also Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable 
Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at 
‘Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society,’ 42 Duke L.J. 727, 732 (1993) (“[T]he notion that 
the Fourth Amendment threshold is to be determined from the viewpoint of the non-criminal has been 
firmly endorsed”); Posner, supra note 39, at 51-2 (arguing that the Amendment cannot protect criminals 
both because “nowhere does the language of the Fourth Amendment suggest a purpose to confer rights on 
criminal defendants” and “the English cases that inspired the Fourth Amendment were not criminal cases”). 
134 Edmond, supra note 130, at 41. 
135 Id. 
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 The Court’s instinctual preference for individualized suspicion in the crime 
control context led it astray in Edmond. There is a force that would prevent such 
roadblocks from becoming routine: the legislature, which would register the annoyance 
of drivers who face even longer commutes because of a law enforcement technique of 
debatable effectiveness. The argument from precedent (or lack thereof) is also unavailing. 
Courts should normally subject crime control techniques to strict scrutiny not because 
they happen to have a crime control purpose, but rather because they involve a great deal 
of executive discretion, which risks imposing arbitrary burdens on individuals. By 
contrast, when groups of people are randomly stopped on the highway, the legislature 
should be able to protect their interests, and balance those interests against the 
effectiveness of the method as a crime control technique, regardless of whether the 
purpose is crime control or something else.136 Just as courts trust legislatures to determine 
the amount of taxes or the details of classifications in pensions policy, they should trust 
legislatures to handle these searches and seizures affecting groups of people. 
 But hyperbole often takes the place of reason when it comes to general searches 
and seizures. In the precursor to Edmond at the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner summoned 
up a parade of horribles to condemn suspicionless searches conducted with a crime 
control purpose.137 He said, “In high-crime areas of America’s cities it might justify 
methods of policing that are associated with totalitarian nations. One can imagine an 
argument that it would be reasonable in a drug-infested neighborhood to administer drug 
                                                 
136 See also Jonathan Kravis, A Better Interpretation of ‘Special Needs’ Doctrine After Edmond and 
Ferguson, 112 Yale L.J. 2591 (criticizing Edmond because there is no reason why searches conducted for 
law-enforcement purposes are categorically less reasonable than those conducted for non-law-enforcement 
purposes, the distinction between searches in the two categories is fuzzy, and drawing the distinction 
involves inquiry into subjective motivation in violation of Whren v. United States). 
137 Edmond v. Goldsmith, supra note 58. 
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tests randomly to drivers and pedestrians.”138 But there were many ways Posner could 
avoid that potentially troublesome result if it ever came up. He could decide that rational 
basis review is generally justified, but that disparate racial impact triggers strict scrutiny. 
Or he could decide that, as in the equal protection and free exercise contexts, disparate 
impact is not constitutionally significant, and uphold such a search as a rational way to 
control the flow of drugs in a crime-ridden community. Regardless, that potential process 
failure does not justify the result in Edmond, where there was no showing of racially 
disparate impact, and thus no reason for intrusive review. 
Furthermore, Posner’s comparison to totalitarian methods was entirely inapt. Our 
society is totally different from a totalitarian one. Instead of a dictatorship, we have a 
legislature that can register and redress wrongs that affect groups of people. Judge 
Easterbrook’s dissent exposed the fallacy of the totalitarian label: 
Some cities enforce their drug laws by heavy reliance on spies, infiltrators, 
informers, turncoats, wiretaps, and nighttime searches where battering 
rams smash through doors; others may substitute more civil methods, such 
as roadblocks where the only imposition is a five-minute wait with man’s 
best friend outside. Which of these is most like the ‘methods of policing 
that are associated with totalitarian nations’?...Scaling back these tactics 
(none of which requires person-specific justification) in favor of 
roadblocks would make enforcement of the drug laws a good deal more 
reasonable. Or so at least the people may conclude.139 
 
Judge Easterbrook’s modesty was appropriate. In a democracy, “the people” who are 
ultimately protected by the Fourth Amendment can conclude that an innovative police 
practice is reasonable. In the absence of process failures, they should have that chance.140 
                                                 
138 Id. at 662. 
139 Id. at 671. 
140 Nor do we run the risk of allowing the creation of a totalitarian society through general searches and 
seizures. Any general search or seizure aimed at the political process or political groups would qualify for 
strict scrutiny, and so long as courts exist, they could invalidate it. 
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 The Edmond rule is particularly perverse because it curtails those general searches 
and seizures that are most reasonable. Actions are criminal precisely because they are 
deeply resented by the community as a whole. Conduct that does not violate the shared 
moral sense of the community is more properly classed as a civil violation rather than 
criminal. General searches with a crime control purpose are thus potentially the most 
useful and of the most interest to the community. The effect of the Edmond rule is thus to 
select out those actions the community most cares about preventing and disqualifying 
them from being the subject of a general search or seizure. 
Since the Edmond rule was announced, communities have predictably tried to use 
pretexts to evade it, so that they might use the general search for the completely laudable 
purpose of controlling crime. For example, in Davis v. State, a Florida community had to 
posit the less important purpose of roadway safety, when the real goals were to reduce 
drugs and prostitution and restore a sense of safety to the neighborhood.141 The search 
was invalidated anyway, to the detriment of that crime-infested neighborhood. Police 
officers, who possess a good deal more common sense than judges, are flummoxed by the 
Edmond rule. They find it difficult to understand that they have the authority to combat 
the lesser harm (like seatbelt violations) but not the greater (like narcotics control). 
Witness this colloquy between a defense lawyer and an officer in a Georgia case, 
concerning the purpose of a checkpoint stop: 
At another point, the officer testified: 
Answer: I don’t know what you mean by setting the purpose of it. The 
purpose is to enforce the laws. 
Question: General law enforcement? 
                                                 
141 Davis v. State, 788 So. 2d 1064 (Ct. of App. Fla. 2001). See also People v. Trotter, 28 A.D.3d 165 (App. 
Div., 4th Dep’t 2006) (invalidating initiative “to detect and deter violent crime and drug trafficking in the 
target area”); People v. Jackson, 782 N.E.2d 67 (N.Y. 2002) (to detect carjackings and taxicab/livery 
robberies that were otherwise undetectable). 
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Answer: Every law. It doesn’t matter… 
Question: And the primary purpose of this checkpoint was not just 
licenses? 
Answer: That’s correct. 
Question: It was general law enforcement? 
Answer: It was—yes. Enforce all the laws of the state of Georgia. 
Question: The primary purpose of this roadblock though, if I understand— 
Answer: To enforce the laws of the state of Georgia.142 
 
In light of the officer’s testimony, the court was compelled to apply Edmond to invalidate 
the checkpoint.143 But it should not have had to. Traffic stops whose interest is crime 
control are highly reasonable. The government interest is greater than an administrative 
traffic stop to, say, check licenses, while the intrusion is no greater than that caused by 
any other five-minute checkpoint. Or at least so a legislature might reasonably conclude. 
 General searches and seizures with a crime control purpose are all the more 
important in an age of mass terror. Such searches are often the only way to detect 
potential disasters. Yet terrorist activity often correlates with criminal offenses, precisely 
because it is so serious. The Court recognized a terrorism exception in Edmond for 
situations where “an appropriately tailored roadblock [is] set up to thwart an imminent 
terrorist attack.”144 But that exception may not cover the more common situation where 
officials have no particularized evidence of an attack—only a constant and credible fear 
of potential attacks and daunting problems of detecting the perpetrators. 
To its credit, the Second Circuit recently upheld New York City’s program of 
suspicionless random inspections on the subway: an obvious high-risk target for terrorist 
                                                 
142 State v. Ayers, 570 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). 
143 The Edmond rule is all the more surprising because in the administrative search context the Court 
recognizes that an administrative inspection scheme may overlap with criminal law enforcement purposes. 
See Burger, supra note 102, at 712 (“[A] State can address a major social problem both by way of an 
administrative scheme and through penal sanctions. Administrative statutes and penal laws may have the 
same ultimate purpose of remedying the social problem, but they have different subsidiary purposes and 
prescribe different methods of addressing the problem”). 
144 Edmond, supra note 130, at 44. 
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attacks, especially in light of the London attacks in the summer of 2005.145 But in 
Bourgeois v. Peters (discussed above), the Eleventh Circuit appeared to embrace an 
extremely restrictive view of the Edmond exception. It stated that a purpose of detecting 
weapons could never justify a general search or seizure because “The City of Columbus 
and the State of Georgia have enacted a variety of laws against the possession or use of 
certain kinds of weapons, smoke bombs, and incendiary devices to achieve this goal of 
public safety” and 
In a case such as this, where the very purpose of the particular law (such 
as the law banning the possession of certain dangerous items) is to protect 
the public, and the government protects the public by enforcing that law, it 
is difficult to see how public safety could be seen as a governmental 
interest independent of law enforcement; the two are inextricably 
intertwined.146 
 
In essence, the Bourgeois court said that anything prohibited by the criminal law cannot 
form the basis for a general search or seizure, even if the purpose of the search is 
something quite apart from enforcing the criminal law—such as preventing a terrorist 
attack. This gives communities confronting terrorism a stark choice: criminalize the 
conduct and lose the option of general searches, or decline to criminalize the conduct and 
use general searches to detect it. 
Society should not be put to that choice. The political process should be perfectly 
capable of dealing with the repercussions and fostering a rational society-wide debate 
about how much privacy the population is willing to sacrifice to prevent terrorism. There 
is nothing special about terrorism that disables the political process from functioning. As 
discussed above, a bipartisan group in Congress joined to prevent the Pentagon from 
data-mining sensitive information about ordinary Americans. The political process has 
                                                 
145 See MacWade v. Kelly, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20587 (2d Cir. 2006). 
146 Bourgeois, supra note 123, at 1313. 
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proved perfectly capable of reaching a resolution on FISA and the PATRIOT Act, even 
though the likelihood of voter engagement is so much less because they adversely affect 
far fewer citizens than the typical general search or seizure. If anything, there will be too 
few general searches and seizures because the subjects of such searches have an 
organizational advantage over the diffuse beneficiaries. 
 Edmond was a pre-9/11 case. Perhaps for that reason, the Court has shown some 
willingness to retreat. In Illinois v. Lidster the Court held that it is permissible for police 
officers with crime control purpose to stop people without suspicion to gather 
information about a potentially witnessed crime (as opposed to identifying a suspect 
traveling in the car).147 The Court seemed to recognize a political process limit on such 
stops: “Practical considerations—namely, limited police resources and community 
hostility to related traffic tie-ups—seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation.”148 The 
same rationale applies to general stops and searches currently barred by Edmond, so long 
as the legislature has authorized them and officers exercise no discretion. Absent the 
process failures discussed above, the groups affected should be perfectly capable of 
preventing such stops from becoming a “routine” part of American life. If they do 
become routine, it will be because the population views them as reasonable. And if that is 
the case, no court could call the judgment “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. 
For all these reasons, Edmond should be overturned. 
                                                 
147 Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004). 
148 Id. at 426. 
 66
B. Second requirement: no general searches or seizures without a “special” need 
 Even if a general search or seizure is not conducted for a law enforcement 
purpose, the Court has held that not any purpose will do. The purpose must still be 
“special,” which the Court defines as “[a] need[], beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement, [which] make[s] the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.”149 And Chandler v. Miller shows that legislative approval is not sufficient 
to make the purpose special.150 The Georgia legislature passed a law requiring candidates 
for high political office to take a drug test thirty days before the election. The Court 
invalidated the requirement, finding that the state had not shown a special enough need 
for the testing. First, the state had not proven that a drug problem existed among elected 
state officials, and anyway, “those officials typically do not perform high-risk, safety-
sensitive tasks.”151 Second, the Court seemed to require a perfect fit between means and 
ends, finding that the test was insufficiently intrusive because a drug user “could abstain 
for a pretest period sufficient to avoid detection.”152 Finally, the Court concluded that the 
benefit of the program was merely symbolic, and that was not a compelling enough 
reason to constitute a special need.153 
The Court’s rationale was exceedingly odd even judged solely by its other special 
needs cases. It had previously approved suspicionless drug testing of student athletes and 
students who participate in extracurricular activities.154 Presumably, preventing the head 
cheerleader from using drugs is not more important than preventing the Governor of 
                                                 
149 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
150 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
151 Id. at 321. 
152 Id. at 320. 
153 Id. at 322. 
154 Vernonia, supra note 82; Earls, supra note 44. 
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Georgia from doing the same.155 And in its employee drug testing cases, the Court has 
not required evidence of a drug problem before permitting testing.156 As a result of this 
inconsistency with the Court’s own precedents, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the 
Court was merely imposing its policy preferences on the State of Georgia: “Nothing in 
the Fourth Amendment or in any other part of the Constitution prevents a State from 
enacting a statute whose principal vice is that it may seem misguided or even silly to the 
members of this Court.”157 
 But the most offensive aspect of Chandler was the Court’s lack of respect for the 
Georgia legislature’s decision in favor of drug testing for political candidates. The 
Georgia legislature had determined that the statute did serve an important public purpose, 
and decided that the interest in having marginally more drug-free candidates outweighed, 
on balance, the minimal intrusion on political candidates’ privacy. Moreover, the 
perceived need was important enough that it overcame the usual legislative inertia that 
makes passing any general search quite difficult. Further, this was no local school board: 
it was a state legislature. The legislature represented the entire political community. 
There was no invidious discrimination, and no vesting of executive discretion. Under 
political process theory, a need should be “special” enough if the legislature had a 
rational basis for thinking it was important. 
 To be sure, Chandler was a somewhat unusual case under process theory. The 
group in this case was “political candidates.” That group might be thought to be specially 
                                                 
155 See George M. Dery, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 73, 88 (1998) (arguing that the drug test at issue in Chandler was 
both less intrusive and more important than those the Court upheld in the school drug testing cases, thus 
demonstrating that special needs analysis under the Fourth Amendment really depends only on “whether or 
not as few as five members of the Court value a particular government action”). 
156 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 676 (1989). 
157 Chandler, supra note 150, at 328. 
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disabled from protecting its members’ interests. Political candidates as a whole are an 
inherently fragmented group. It is nearly impossible to organize a group of political 
candidates from all different parties for any purpose, much less for the purpose of 
fighting unreasonable candidate drug testing (which might be career suicide). The 
candidates’ political differences are precisely why they belong to different parties. There 
may as a result be unusually high barriers to collective action, and Chandler itself might 
represent a special case warranting stricter scrutiny. In fact, it could be argued that the 
Court should strictly scrutinize any search or seizure directed at the political process as 
such, since that may be necessary to safeguard dissenters and the political system as a 
whole. 
 But the principle of Chandler requiring a special need beyond legislative 
authorization for any general search or seizure is pernicious. The lower courts have, for 
example, applied Chandler to outlaw for all time general drug testing for school 
teachers.158 This is an especially odd result since employees in the private sector are 
routinely subjected to drug tests. It is not clear why teachers should receive a special 
exemption from this common employment practice. 
 Both Edmond and Chandler represent a presumption against general suspicionless 
searches and seizures. As this Article has shown, this presumption is unjustified, given 
the Court’s assumption in other areas of constitutional law that groups can protect 
themselves, and given the good reasons to expect that they should be even more capable 
                                                 
158 See, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep’t Mechanics v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068 (10th Cir. 1998) 
(refusing to find special need for drug testing program where state’s proffered purpose was to ensure 
workplace safety and health in dangerous context of mechanics’ work); United Teachers v. Orleans Parish 
Sch. Bd., 142 F.3d 853 (5th Cir. 1998) (invalidating suspicionless drug testing of teachers). Even when a 
court upholds such a test, Chandler makes it exceedingly hard to do so, as witnessed by Knox County 
Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding drug testing program 
for teachers, after 42 pages of analysis). 
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of protecting themselves against general searches and seizures. The political process 
functions as the ultimate check on the proliferation of those practices. If the intrusions 
become too prevalent, the searched groups have ready recourse to the legislature. If 
anything, the legislature will approve too few of these searches because the benefits are 
diffuse and the costs are concentrated, which gives the affected groups an organizational 
advantage as against the beneficiaries. 
 But there are other reasons, aside from our preference for democratic 
decisionmaking, that make the Court’s presumption against general suspicionless 
searches and seizures odd. First, broad suspicionless searches and seizures do not carry 
the same stigma as suspicion-based searches. Suspicion-based searches by their nature 
imply that the subject has done something wrong.159 The Court itself recognized this 
factor in one of its school drug testing cases. It found that in the school context, 
suspicion-based drug testing “may be impracticable, for one thing, simply because the 
parents who are willing to accept random drug testing for athletes are not willing to 
accept accusatory drug testing for all students, which transforms the process into a badge 
of shame.”160 The same is true of any suspicion-based search—or so a legislature might 
presume. 
 Second, general searches and seizures are often preferable because they minimize 
the risk of invidious discrimination, as compared with suspicion-based searches. 
Suspicion-based searches inevitably carry this risk because, despite the probable cause 
and reasonable suspicion standards, police still have the ability to pick and choose among 
targets for whom there is probable cause or reasonable suspicion. For example, police 
                                                 
159 See Stuntz, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 553, 565 (1992) (noting that innocent people might prefer broader search 
regime to one with individualized suspicion). 
160 Vernonia, supra note 82, at 663. 
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have wide discretion to choose among the pool of speeders on the highway, and may use 
this discretion to target minority drivers: the well-known phenomenon of “driving while 
black.”161 Moreover, the remedy for such police discrimination is often inadequate. The 
Equal Protection Clause provides the only remedy, and it requires proof of intentional 
discrimination. If the police officer never records what he was thinking, this intent is 
impossible to prove.162 Discovering police intent is even more difficult than discovering 
intent in other equal protection contexts because of the “blue wall of silence” that 
prevents discovery of accurate information about police activities.163 For this reason, Bill 
Stuntz has concluded that “it is the individual stops that carry the greatest risks of both 
harm to the target and discrimination by the police. It is also the individual stops that are 
hardest for the citizenry to monitor.”164 In any event, it is certainly perverse from a 
political process perspective to apply a special needs requirement that disfavors broad 
suspicionless searches and thus forces legislatures, against their will, to use searches that 
carry a greater risk of discrimination against discrete and insular minorities.165 
Because there is no ex ante reason to distrust this kind of search, and because the 
political process serves to curtail their inefficient deployment, the Chandler special needs 
principle, like the Edmond rule, has no basis in political process theory. A need is special 
                                                 
161 See note 119 above, on the phenomenon of “driving while black.” 
162 See Washington v. Davis, supra note 116. 
163 See David A. Slansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the Future of the Fourth Amendment, 
1997 Sup. Ct. Rev. 271, 326 (“Equal protection doctrine treats claims of inequitable policing the same as 
any other claim of inequity; it gives no recognition to the special reasons to insist on evenhanded law 
enforcement, or to the distinctive concerns with arbitrariness underlying the Fourth Amendment. As a 
result, challenges to discriminatory police practices will fail without proof of conscious racial animus on 
the part of the police…[T]his amounts to saying that they will almost always fail.”). 
164 Stuntz, Local Policing, supra note 1, at 2168. 
165 See also Earls, supra note 44, at 837 (“Moreover, we question whether testing based on individualized 
suspicion in fact would be less intrusive…A program of individualized suspicion might unfairly target 
members of unpopular groups.”). 
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enough if it attracts legislative attention. A court determining the specialness of the need 
is only sitting as an adjunct legislature: an improper state of affairs in a democracy. 
 
C. Third requirement: no general searches and seizures that a court deems unreasonable 
 
 Finally, even if a general search or seizure does not have a crime control purpose 
and has a “special” need, the courts often conduct a de novo review of the reasonableness 
of the search. The constitutionality of checkpoint stops without a crime control purpose 
“still depends on a balancing of the competing interests at stake and the effectiveness of 
the program,” though the courts do defer somewhat to the political branches’ 
determination of effectiveness.166 The courts are far less deferential in other areas. For 
example, in drug testing cases, the court must “balance the governmental and privacy 
interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable-cause requirements in the 
particular context.”167 The Court mandates a similarly intrusive review in the 
administrative search context.168 And the courts do not uphold the search if it has any 
rational basis. Rather, they independently weigh the costs and benefits, without deferring 
to the legislature’s judgment.169 
 Critics have long taken issue with the courts’ application of this balancing test. 
They claim that courts are incompetent to conduct any real weighing of social costs and 
benefits, and therefore the test merely masks an application of the judges’ own policy 
preferences. Justice Brennan, dissenting in T.L.O. v. New Jersey, said, 
All of these ‘balancing tests’ amount to brief nods by the Court in the 
direction of a neutral utilitarian calculus while the Court in fact engages in 
                                                 
166 Edmond, supra note 130, at 47. 
167 Skinner, supra note 149, at 619. 
168 See Burger, supra note 102, at 702. 
169 See, e.g., Vernonia, supra note 82; Earls, supra note 44. 
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an unanalyzed exercise of judicial will…On my view, the presence of the 
word ‘unreasonable’ in the text of the Fourth Amendment does not grant a 
shifting majority of this Court the authority to answer all Fourth 
Amendment questions by consulting its momentary vision of the social 
good.170 
 
These critics believe that because the balancing test is so malleable, it follows that the 
more concrete standards of warrant and probable cause must apply to all searches and 
seizures.171 
 The critics are correct that courts are in no position to weigh the social costs and 
benefits of general searches and seizures. As shown above, there are at least five reasons 
why legislatures are more competent than judges in this area: their ability to conduct 
meaningful balancing, their ability to collect facts, their greater legitimacy, their ability to 
accommodate local variation, and their ability to adapt to changed circumstances. And 
the Court trusts legislatures to weigh the costs and benefits of social policy affecting 
regular groups in most areas except police policy. 
But far from supporting more stringent application of the equally arbitrary 
requirements of warrant and probable cause, the relative incompetence of courts implies 
that legislatures should be presumptively responsible for the balancing. A general search 
or seizure affects groups of people that can protect their interests through political 
channels.172 We basically trust legislatures to balance costs and benefits in every other 
area of social policy where process failures are absent, even when constitutional values 
                                                 
170 T.L.O., supra note 37, at 369-70. 
171 See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and 
Terry, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 383, 439 (1988) (arguing that balancing tests conducted by courts will inordinately 
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172 See Klarman, supra note 1, at 826 (arguing that the drug testing cases clearly violate any notion of 
political process theory, because “a majoritarian legislature presumably would not consent to such 
widespread privacy invasions unless substantial countervailing benefits were generated”). 
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are implicated, as in the due process, equal protection, and free exercise contexts. There 
is thus no reason to make a special exception for deprivations of privacy that affect 
groups. If anything, the affected groups have an organizational advantage and should be 
disproportionately capable of blocking practices that affect their privacy. A court should 
restrict itself to spotting process failures such as executive discretion and discrimination. 
Otherwise, the court should uphold the policy if it has any rational basis—not merely if it 
seems wise or expedient. Once the Court has decided that reasonableness is the 
appropriate test under the Fourth Amendment—as it has in countless cases—the natural 
implication is that the legislature should be responsible for determining reasonableness in 
the absence of a process failure. 
 This Part has shown that the Court’s treatment of general searches and seizures is 
unsupportable. Rather than inquiring into the purpose of the search and conducting an 
intrusive review of the practice, the Court should simply ascertain whether a process 
failure is present and, if not, apply only rational basis review. It remains only to answer 
some of the inevitable criticisms from other schools of constitutional interpretation that 
will be levied against this approach to the Fourth Amendment. 
 
IV. The ambiguity of the Framers’ intentions regarding legislatively authorized general 
searches and seizures 
 
The political process approach conflicts with two theories of the Fourth 
Amendment that have at one time or another been embraced by one or more justices. It is 
worthwhile to conclude by showing that both theories are without merit. 
 The first theory claims that the Amendment’s command of reasonableness 
requires an irreducible level of suspicion before the government can search or seize. On 
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this view, even if the ideal conditions of democracy are present (a set of conditions that 
political process theory tries to replicate), the legislature cannot authorize departures 
below that level of suspicion.173 
Chief Justice Taft’s opinion in Carroll v. United States was the progenitor of this 
view. He remarked, “It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were 
authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all 
persons lawfully using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a 
search.”174 Regardless of the fact that large groups of people who could be heard in the 
political process were affected, Taft would have required probable cause to search any 
given car. 
Justice Brennan is the modern proponent of the irreducible suspicion theory of the 
Fourth Amendment. In his dissent in the seminal case of T.L.O. v. New Jersey, he said, 
The Fourth Amendment was designed not merely to protect against 
official intrusions whose social utility was less as measured by some 
‘balancing test’ than its intrusion on individual privacy; it was designed in 
addition to grant the individual a zone of privacy whose protections could 
be breached only where the ‘reasonable’ requirements of the probable-
cause standard were met. Moved by whatever momentary evil has aroused 
their fears, officials—perhaps even supported by a majority of citizens—
may be tempted to conduct searches that sacrifice the liberty of each 
citizen to assuage the perceived evil. But the Fourth Amendment rests on 
the principle that a true balance between the individual and society 
depends on the recognition of ‘the right to be let alone—the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’175 
 
                                                 
173 See Klarman, supra note 1, at 767 (“The fourth amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and 
seizures can be conceptualized as serving two distinct values: (1) creating a zone of personal privacy 
unimpingeable by government (except for compelling reasons), and (2) protecting against illegitimate 
exercise of discretionary authority by law enforcement officers. Political process theory wholly supports 
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174 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1924). 
175 T.L.O., supra note 37, at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Brennan thus also condemned any deviation from the probable cause standard, which in 
his view represented the constitutional baseline below which neither courts nor 
legislatures could depart. 
The first thing to note is that Brennan lost. The Court has repeatedly held that the 
Amendment does not require any irreducible level of suspicion for searching and 
seizing.176 Reasonableness is the touchstone.177 And once reasonableness is seen as the 
operative clause, it is difficult to see why judges should have the authority to revise a 
legislative judgment, in the absence of a process failure. Reasonableness implies some 
balancing of costs and benefits—both broadly defined, of course, to include privacy, 
liberty, and dignity values. Absent a process failure that blocks access, legislatures are 
presumptively capable of conducting that balancing, as shown in Part I. Courts will of 
course always retain a role in monitoring most police behavior, because it does involve 
executive discretion. But where that process failure is absent, as in the typical general 
search or seizure, a legislature’s judgment should control. 
The second thing to note is that Brennan lost for a reason: his position is atextual. 
The controlling clause of the Fourth Amendment requires only reasonableness. The 
Amendment mandates probable cause only when a warrant issues, and not necessarily in 
other circumstances. Historians have confirmed that this is a correct reading of the 
Amendment. The probable cause requirement was intended to be a barrier to getting a 
warrant, because the warrant was an evil at the time of the founding that rendered 
executive officials immune from civil damages for arbitrarily broad searches and 
                                                 
176 See Martinez-Fuerte, supra note 37, at 560 (“The defendants note correctly that to accommodate public 
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seizures.178 Probable cause was not intended to be the sine qua non of reasonableness. 
Where the problem of executive discretion is not present, the text provides no reason to 
require any level of suspicion. All that remains is the judge’s own opinion that 
reasonableness requires some level of suspicion. And that opinion should fall in the face 
of a proper majority vote, which is presumably better able than Justice Brennan to 
determine what “the people” protected by the Amendment deem reasonable. 
 A more serious objection to the political process approach does not claim that the 
Fourth Amendment requires an irreducible level of suspicion. Rather, it claims that the 
Amendment embodies a strong presumption against suspicionless searches and seizures. 
Thus, in order to be reasonable, such searches must be strictly circumscribed, and a court 
must do the circumscribing. 
This theory finds support in the original understanding of the Amendment. As is 
well known, the Amendment was primarily intended to outlaw the practice of the general 
warrant: a device that gave royal officials the authority to conduct broad searches and 
seizures of private homes and businesses. The theory analogizes the general search to a 
general warrant, and claims that general searches too must have been excluded from the 
framers’ understanding of “reasonableness” and must be strictly cabined, even if a 
legislature approves it, absent a constitutional amendment. 
 Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Vernonia is the chief example of this argument. She 
argued that the Fourth Amendment prohibits broad-based searches unless they are the 
only effective way to achieve some important governmental interest.179 She noted that 
“what the Framers of the Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed, with limited 
                                                 
178 See Amar, supra note 12, at 770; Posner, supra note 39, at 72. 
179 Vernonia, supra note 82, at 667. 
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exceptions wholly inapplicable here, were general searches—that is, searches by general 
warrant, by writ of assistance, by broad statute, or by any other similar authority.”180 This 
is undoubtedly true. But those practices are all distinguishable from general searches. 
Each involved a great deal of executive discretion. The general warrant, for example, 
immunized executive officials from civil damages for arbitrarily broad searches and 
seizures. The Framers thus may very well have been concerned not with the fact that the 
general warrant was general, but with the fact that it was a “warrant,” as that term was 
understood at the time. 
The text of the Amendment is perfectly consistent with that position: rather than 
outlaw general searches, the Framers simply placed significant limits on the breadth of 
warrants. And the political process approach also recognizes that general warrants are an 
evil. Strict scrutiny is justified when the legislature authorizes a scheme that vests 
executive officials with a great deal of discretion. The general warrant is essentially the 
case of Delaware v. Prouse, which comes out the same way under the political process 
approach. The example of general warrants is thus no objection to the process approach 
to the Amendment. 
O’Connor nevertheless claimed that the framers would have disapproved of a 
political process approach to the Amendment: “More important, there is no indication in 
the historical materials that the Framers’ opposition to general searches stemmed solely 
from the fact that they allowed officials to single out individuals for arbitrary reasons, 
and thus that officials could render them reasonable simply by making sure to extend 
their search to every house in a given area or to every person in a given group.”181 
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O’Connor’s argument does not prove much because it is phrased in the negative. It is true 
that there is no evidence the framers would have approved of general searches that 
applied to everyone equally. But there is also no evidence that they would have objected. 
The historical materials on the Fourth Amendment are notoriously spotty, and provide no 
definitive guidance either way.182 If anything, the framers likely would not have been 
capable of comprehending what this article terms a general search or seizure. At the time 
of the founding, there were no organized police forces and thus no administrative state 
capable of conducting such searches.183 Given that the historical materials are ambiguous 
at best, the case based on original meaning is not compelling. The political process 
approach preserves the recognized core of the original meaning of the Amendment: the 
concern with executive discretion. In the absence of more concrete guidance, the political 
process approach is certainly not foreclosed. 
 Moreover, the Fourth Amendment must be read in conjunction with the framers’ 
basic trust of representative democracy. As Ely noted, “We have as a society from the 
beginning, and now almost instinctively, accepted the notion that a representative 
democracy must be our form of government. The very process of adopting the 
Constitution was designed to be, and in some respects it was, more democratic than any 
that had preceded it.”184 Prof. Amar has shown that the original Constitution was a 
profoundly democratic document for its time.185 The Bill of Rights was of course 
intended to be a limit on majoritarian rule. But the political process approach is consistent 
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with the purpose of the Bill of Rights, which was to limit majoritarian excess while 
preserving as much self-government as possible. By focusing the courts on policing those 
general searches and seizures where the political process is most likely to go awry, the 
political process approach is consonant with the framers’ vision for the Bill of Rights. 
The approach provides significant constraints on legislative action: courts continue to 
scrutinize such searches for discrimination, executive discretion, and rational basis. 
Without more explicit original meaning evidence to the contrary, the framers should not 
be found to have foreclosed a political process approach to the Amendment. 
 Finally, O’Connor’s position, like Brennan’s, is arbitrary because it invalidates a 
legislative judgment where there is no process failure and no clear text or original 
understanding on point. She permits a great number of general searches: those that judges 
deem necessary to fulfilling an important governmental purpose. The examples she cites 
include the building inspections in Camara and, most surprising, other drug tests!186 Her 
version of the original understanding is thus quite equivocal, and it is unclear why judges 
rather than legislatures should get to decide when a general search is “necessary.” 
O’Connor’s position thus ultimately runs up against the same problem that Brennan’s 
did. Once the Court has interpreted the text of the Amendment as requiring only 
reasonableness, it is very difficult to argue that judges rather than legislatures should be 
conducting the balance between liberty and security. 
 A final objection to the political process approach is textual: that it makes the 
Fourth Amendment redundant by converting it into a mini-Equal Protection clause. It is 
true that the approach is informed by principles that have shaped equal protection 
doctrine. But that is not damning. The Court has already adopted an equal-protection-
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style approach to interpreting the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division v. Smith, 
where it held that rational basis review applies so long as a law burdening religious 
practice is neutral and generally applicable.187 Further, as the Court noted in Lukumi, “In 
determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can 
also find guidance in our equal protection cases.”188 There is no reason why the Fourth 
Amendment cannot also be informed by principles that have shaped equal protection law. 
Moreover, even once we carve out general searches for rational basis review, the 
Fourth Amendment retains plenty of independent force not found in any other 
constitutional provision. Executive discretion is an inherent part of most police activity, 
so the courts will retain a major role in elaborating guidelines for police conduct under 
the Amendment. Finally, even in the realm of general searches, the standards for political 
process review of general searches and seizures do not have to be identical to equal 
protection standards. As noted above, disparate impact review might be appropriate in the 
Fourth Amendment context because of the particular stigmatic harms of searches and 
seizures and the history of racial problems in policing. Consistency with the Court’s 
interpretation of the due process, equal protection, free exercise, and takings clauses 
should be counted as a virtue of the political process theory, not a drawback. 
 Arguments from text and original meaning against the political process approach 
are thus unavailing. The Amendment requires no irreducible level of suspicion, except 
where warrants are involved. And the process approach is entirely consistent with the 
only unambiguous evidence of the framers’ intent: the prohibition on general warrants. 
Any other attempt to give substantive content to reasonableness is simply inconsistent 
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with our general trust of legislatures to weigh costs and benefits and determine the social 
good. A legislature’s judgment that a particular general search or seizure is reasonable 
should be entitled to deference. The presumptive capacity of the legislature to weigh 
costs and benefits is quite simply what it means to live in a democracy rather than a 
judge-ocracy. 
 
V. Conclusion: Eliminating the irrational fear of general searches and seizures 
 The political process approach outlined in the previous three Parts should not be 
controversial. Nearly all the justices have endorsed some version of it in some general 
search or seizure opinion.189 And the Court has adopted a similar approach in many other 
areas of constitutional law. Yet an argument that legislatures should be primarily 
responsible for defining the reasonableness of general searches and seizures is bound to 
strike some readers as counter-intuitive. Hopefully the preceding arguments have 
alleviated many of their concerns. There are three reasons why courts should apply 
rational basis review to general suspicionless searches authorized by a legislature: the 
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Court trusts groups to protect their own interests in every other area of constitutional law; 
legislatures are particularly capable of implementing the cost-effectiveness guarantee of 
the Fourth Amendment; and, if anything, legislatures will authorize too few general 
searches and seizures because of the organizational advantage possessed by the affected 
groups. 
It also bears emphasizing that nearly every general search and seizure case the 
Court has heretofore considered would come out the same way, though for different 
reasons. Edmond, for example, would rest on the ground of no legislative authorization. 
Chandler is the only case where a legislature authorized the search and arguably no 
process failure was present. Accordingly, the suggestions in this Article mean mainly a 
change in emphasis and a change in the way the Court approaches Fourth Amendment 
questions, not a license to subject the population to scores of general searches and 
seizures. 
In fact, it is precisely because affected groups wield so much power in the 
political process that there is so little to fear from rational basis review of general 
searches and seizures. Because intensely interested groups are so powerful in the political 
process, it is extremely difficult for legislatures to approve general search and seizure 
programs that target voters.190 And because passage is so difficult, the Court should pay 
all the more attention to a program that has made it through the legislative gauntlet. Such 
a program is surely entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. The reflexive responses 
against a political process approach are just so much hyperbole. The remark in Skinner—
that drug testing of employees is the first step on a slippery slope to “[t]he World War II 
relocation-camp cases and the Red Scare and McCarthy-era internal subversion cases”—
                                                 
190 Disenfranchised prisoners may be another story, see below. 
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is off base. If a legislature ever tried to conduct a general search or seizure directed at a 
racial minority or at a fundamental freedom like the right to free speech, the courts would 
retain full authority to invalidate the practice if it was not necessary to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest. 
 The political process approach is eminently “reasonable.” It places responsibility 
for defining reasonableness or cost-effectiveness in the institution that we usually trust 
with that task: the legislature. And there is no risk of unfairness because the courts remain 
to police process failures. 
 The main purpose of this Article has been to restructure the discourse surrounding 
general searches and seizures. Too often the debate among judges turns into a slippery 
slope, ending in a totalitarian regime. This all-too-familiar trope should be retired. It 
reflects an irrational distrust of democracy. So long as such searches affect groups of 
people, and so long as courts exist to police the situations where the political process 
might go awry, the legislature should be perfectly capable of reaching a reasonable 
accommodation between security and privacy. 
 The need for a shift in discourse is evident from the Ninth Circuit’s recent 
decision in United States v. Kincade.191 The case concerned the constitutionality of a 
Congressional statute requiring the extraction of DNA from convicted felons. The 
practice is somewhat interesting in its own right because it is another in a long line of 
cases in tension with Edmond’s prohibition of crime control purposes. The purpose of the 
DNA extraction is quite clearly to solve future crimes that the particular convict might 
                                                 
191 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 84
commit.192 But despite Edmond, all the circuits have upheld the practice.193 And political 
process theory has no quarrel with a court independently weighing the costs and benefits 
of DNA extraction: felons are often disenfranchised, and thus legislatures cannot be 
expected to give proper weight to their interests in privacy. 
 What is objectionable is the rhetoric that surrounds DNA extraction. Kincade 
produced a dissent improbably pairing Judges Reinhardt and Kozinski. They argued that 
“[u]nder the rationales [the majority] espouse… all Americans will be at risk, sooner 
rather than later, of having our DNA samples permanently placed on file in federal 
cyberspace, and perhaps even worse, of being subjected to various other governmental 
programs providing for suspicionless searches conducted for law enforcement 
purposes.”194 They then summoned the parade of horribles: “The compulsory extraction 
of blood samples and the maintenance of permanent DNA profiles of American citizens 
is, unfortunately, the beginning not the end. 1984 arrives twenty years later than 
predicted.”195 
 The problem with the dissent’s argument is that our society is totally different 
from the one depicted in 1984. That is a novel portraying a totalitarian government. Our 
society is a democracy with political checks built in. Is it any accident that the DNA 
extraction statute only applies to people who cannot vote? The political backlash would 
doom to defeat any politician who proposed putting all Americans into a DNA registry. 
But if there ever comes a day when a majority of legislators could support such a 
                                                 
192 The government claims that another purpose is to exculpate those same convicts. But if the purpose 
were exculpation, the convict would be willing to voluntarily provide a DNA sample at some later date. See 
United States v. Weikert, 421 F. Supp. 2d 259, 265 (D. Mass. 2006) (“The government’s purpose is not 
merely the disinterested creation of a database. Instead, the government’s purpose is to obtain information 
related to possible crimes that the individual subject to the search may have committed.”). 
193 See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2005). 
194 Kincade, supra note 191, at 843 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). 
195 Id. at 870. 
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proposal, would judges be so bold as to say that the measure is not reasonable? Many 
things that were once considered unreasonable are now obviously reasonable. The 
framers would have been troubled by the fact that we have a standing army of police 
officers in our midst; we quite literally cannot do without them. Using the Fourth 
Amendment as a bar to change that the political process justifiably deems reasonable is 
the worst kind of sentimentalism. And it denigrates the value of self-government. 
The Kincade dissent thus had it exactly wrong. Courts should strictly review 
general suspicionless searches of convicts. But the fact that legislatures are willing to 
approve those searches says nothing about what they are willing to do to voters. Courts 
should trust the political process to approve the right balance when it comes to searches 
and seizures of groups of ordinary citizens. If anything, as discussed above, too few of 
these searches will occur because of the disproportionate power wielded by intensely 
interested, medium-sized groups, which have an organizational advantage over diffuse 
beneficiaries. 
 As with other areas of constitutional law, the political process approach to general 
searches and seizures promises a sound division of labor between the institutions of 
government. It will enhance liberty. Legislatures will no longer be constrained to rely on 
inefficient amounts of suspicion-based searching—which also pose an unavoidable risk 
of invidious discrimination. The discourse surrounding general searches and seizures will 
improve. The debate will take place in terms ordinary people can understand instead of in 
the legalese of the courts of appeals. And the courts will augment their own legitimacy. 
Instead of using malleable and ad hoc balancing tests to strike down general searches and 
seizures, courts will be the guardians of democracy, intervening only when process 
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failures make it necessary. There is nothing to fear from giving legislatures primacy in 
deciding the reasonableness of general searches and seizures. And there is very much to 
gain. 
